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EXECUTIVE PAY CLAWBACKS AND THEIR TAXATION

by
David I Walker*
ABSTRACT

Executive pay clawback provisions require executives to repay previously received compensation under certain circumstances, such as a
downward adjustment to the financial results upon which their incentive pay was predicated. The use of these provisions is on the rise, and
the SEC is expected to soon finalize rules implementing a mandatory,
no-fault clawback requirementenacted as part of the Dodd-Franklegislation. The tax issue raisedby clawbacks is this: should executives be
allowed to recover taxes previously paid on compensation that is
returnedto the company as a result ofa claw back provision? This Article argues that a full tax offset regime is most in keeping with the
evolving rationalesfor clawbacks, with consistent treatment of executives subject to clawbacks, with encouragingeven-handed implementation ofclawbacks, and with minimizing clawback-induceddistortions
and other unintended consequences associatedwith a tax regime that
would not provide full offsets. But the tax treatment of clawback payments has been uncertain, and the enactment of the Tax Cuts and Jobs
Act adds to that uncertainty. Meanwhile, adoption of legislation to
ensure that executives arefully compensatedfor taxes previously paid
on recouped compensation is probably a political non-starter. Given
that, this Article argues that the IRS and courts should interpret the
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relevant tax laws liberally to maximize recovery of taxes paid on
clawed back compensation.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Executive pay clawback provisions require executives to forfeit previously received compensation under certain circumstances, most notably after a downward adjustment to the financial results upon which
their incentive compensation was predicated. Clawback provisions are
on the rise. Limited clawbacks were mandated under the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002 (SOX).1 The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank) mandated a much more
comprehensive no-fault clawback regime, 2 and the SEC is in the process
of finalizing rules to implement the Dodd-Frank clawback. 3 Meanwhile,
the fraction of S&P 1500 companies proactively adopting clawback provisions more expansive than those mandated by SOX increased from

1. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745
(2002) [hereinafter SOX] (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and
29 U.S.C.).
2. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 954, 124 Stat. 1376, 1904 (2010) [hereinafter DoddFrank].
3. The SEC released proposed rules implementing the Dodd-Frank
clawback on July 1, 2015. See Listing Standards for Recovery of Erroneously
Awarded Compensation, Dodd-Frank Act Release No. 33-9861, 80 Fed. Reg.
41,144 (July 15, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2015/33-9861.pdf
[https://perma.cc/89NV-M8TF] [hereinafter SEC Release].
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less than 1% in 2004 to 62% in 2013,4 and a recent report indicates that
more than 90% of the 1000 largest companies have disclosed that they
have adopted clawback policies of one sort or another.5
This Article focuses on the federal income tax consequences
of clawbacks, specifically on the tax treatment of repayments by executives in cases in which the compensation repaid has been included in
taxable income in a prior year. This is surprisingly under-explored terrain,6 particularly given that individual taxes can consume as much as
50% of executive compensation.

4. Ilona Babenko et al., Clawback Provisions and Firm Risk 42
(Apr. 30, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=3382498
[https://perma.cc/7S78-FCJ9] [hereinafter BBBCS].
5. Joshua A. Agen, Compensation Clawbacks: Trends and Lessons
Learned, FOLEY (Oct. 21, 2020), https://www.foley.com/en/insights/publications
/2020/10/compensation-clawbacks-trends-and-lessons-learned [https://perma
.cc/SG8F-HX58].
6. Several law review articles have addressed clawback provisions
from a corporate governance perspective, either as their primary focus, e.g.,
Jesse Fried & Nitzan Shilon, Excess-Pay Clawbacks, 36 J. CORP. L. 721 (2011);
Jesse M. Fried, Rationalizing the Dodd-FrankClawback (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Law Working Paper No. 314/2016, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2764409 [https://perma.cc/P3DU-A7KG]; John
Patrick Kelsh, Section 304 of the Sarbanes-OxleyAct of 2002: The Casefor a
Personal CulpabilityRequirement, 59 Bus. LAW. 1005, 1017-19 (2004); or at
least in passing, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank: Quack Federal
Corporate GovernanceRound I, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1779, 1806-07 (2011); Steven A. Bank & George S. Georgiev, Paying High for Low Performance, 100
MINN. L. REV HEADNOTES 14, 23-27 (2016); Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano,
Reforming Executive Compensation: Focusing and Committing to the Longterm, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 359, 366 (2009); Kevin J. Murphy & Michael C.
Jensen, The Politics of Pay: The Unintended Consequences of Regulating
Executive Compensation 41 (USC Law Legal Studies Paper No. 18-8, 2018),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=3153147
[https://perma
.cc/FP5N-25H4]. Meanwhile, a number of researchers from the finance and
accounting disciplines have investigated the implications of clawback provisions for firm value and risk. E.g., BBBCS, supra note 4; Tor-Erik Bakke
et al., The Value Implications of Mandatory Clawback Provisions (June 28,
2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2890578 [https://
perma.cc/8LW6-J442]. To date, however, there has been little academic discussion of the tax policy implications of clawbacks. Exceptions include
Rosina B. Barker & Kevin P. O'Brien, Taxing Clawbacks: Theory and
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Imagine the following scenario. In 2019, Executive receives a
$1 million cash bonus based on the Company's achievement of a certain earnings target. In 2020, the Company restates and reduces 2019
earnings. Based on the restated earnings, Executive would have been
entitled to a $700,000 bonus for 2019, and under the Dodd-Frank clawback regime, the Executive is required to repay $300,000 to her Company. Assuming that the Company was able to deduct the payment in
2019, it will be required to include the repaid amount in taxable income
for 2020. Executive will have included and paid tax on $1 million of
compensation in 2019. Should she receive a deduction in 2020 for the
$300,000 repayment? Should the answer depend on whether Executive
signed off on the 2019 earnings figure? On whether Executive "cooked
the books" herself or enlisted an underling to do so? What if a deduction is allowed but, due to various limitations discussed below, fails to
make Executive whole for the taxes incurred on the repaid compensa-

tion? Should additional relief be available?
These are very real, and with implementation of the mandatory, no-fault, Dodd-Frank clawback looming, likely soon to be very
pressing issues. This Article considers these questions, focusing first
on what the tax rules optimally should be. I conclude that optimally
executives should be made whole for taxes paid on compensation that
is subsequently repaid as a result of a clawback provision. This result is
dictated most strongly if the underlying rationale for clawbacks is prevention of unjust enrichment and/or facilitating the management of
executive risk-taking incentives. If the primary goal of clawbacks is to
minimize the payoffs to and thus the amount of financial misreporting,
one could argue that deductibility of clawback repayments is unnecessary and possibly even counterproductive. Even in this case, however,
the risk of mistake and false positives weighs in favor of refunding
previously paid tax.7
But there are other reasons to prefer a clawback tax regime
providing full recovery of tax paid on compensation that is

Practice, 129 TAX NOTES 423 (Oct. 25, 2010); and Matthew A. Melone, Adding
Insult to Injury: The FederalIncome Tax Consequences of the Clawback of
Executive Compensation, 25 AKRON TAX J. 55 (2010). Although not directly
aimed at clawback provisions, Professor Douglas Kahn has recently published
a highly relevant article in Tax Notes: Douglas A. Kahn, Return of an Employee's Claim ofRight Income, 163 TAX NOTEs FED. 1819 (June 17, 2019).
7. Infra Part III.C.
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subsequently returned. First, a full tax offset approach will provide
consistent tax treatment of executives irrespective of their decision to
defer compensation and tax and will avoid punishing innocent executives forced to repay compensation under no-fault clawback regimes.
Second, executives and firms are less likely to voluntarily adopt comprehensive and meaningful clawback provisions, or to fairly enforce
mandatory clawback obligations, if the tax treatment is asymmetric;
that is, if taxes are not fully refunded when compensation is repaid, and
to the extent that taxes are not fully refunded, we can expect that executives will demand to be compensated for the tax risk.' Third, whether
mandated or voluntarily adopted, the existence of clawback provisions
may distort the design of executive pay, and asymmetric tax treatment
of repayments may amplify those distortions. When these additional
effects are considered, the case for refunding becomes stronger, whatever the rationale for clawback adoption.9
How does present tax law match up? It's complicated, but in a
nutshell, repayment of clawed back compensation generally should be
deductible by executives as ordinary and necessary business deductions
under I.R.C. @ 162 or as business losses under @ 165. But basic deductibility is only one part of the equation. The @@ 162/165 deduction for
clawed back compensation is a miscellaneous itemized deduction
(MID). Prior to 2018, MIDs were deductible only to the extent that they
exceeded 2% of AGI, were not deductible for purposes of the alternative
minimum tax, and were, along with other itemized deductions, phased
down for high income taxpayers under I.R.C. @ 68. As a result, a deduction for compensation repaid was unlikely to make an executive whole
for taxes paid on that compensation in prior years. The basic deductibility picture became clearer, but much worse, with the passage of the Tax
Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA). Under that legislation, MIDs are simply not
deductible for tax years 2018 through 2025. So, as far as we have gone,
there would be no effective deduction for compensation clawed back in
any of the next several years."

8. Compensation could take the form of ex ante increases in pay
to offset the tax risk or tax "gross up" payments in the event that clawbacks do
not result in full refunds of previously paid tax. This Article considers both

possibilities.
9.
10.

Infra Part III.C.2.
Infra Part IV.A.
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But that brings us to I.R.C. @ 1341, a provision that can make
taxpayers whole for repayments of amounts received under a "claim of
right" that are later repaid. When it applies, @ 1341 provides a nonmiscellaneous itemized deduction (still deductible under the TCJA)
equal to the value of the current year deduction under @@ 162/165 or, if
more valuable, a tax credit equal to the reduction in tax in prior years
that would have occurred had the recouped compensation never been
included in income in the first place."
The bottom line here is that @ 1341 could be applied to executive pay clawbacks to get to the right result, or close to the right result,
in most cases. However, there is a significant risk that it will be applied
in such a way as to bar recovery in an excessive number of cases. Ideally, Congress or the Treasury would amend @ 1341 or the regulations
thereunder to make it clear that executives should be made whole for
taxes paid on clawed back compensation, but this may be unlikely in the
present environment. Moreover, there is a concern about optics. Allowing deductions for repaid compensation, particularly in cases in which
the executive doing the repaying is at fault, looks like a tax subsidy for
bad behavior. It isn't a subsidy, but if clawbacks become frequent and if
executives succeed in employing @ 1341 to recoup the tax paid on clawed
back compensation, it would not be surprising if one or more members
of Congress proposed legislation to bar such deductions. Perhaps the
best we can hope for is that the courts will construe @ 1341 liberally to
allow deduction and that Congress and the Treasury will do nothing.
The remainder of the Article is organized as follows. Part II
provides an overview of clawback provisions, including existing and
forthcoming legislatively mandated clawbacks as well as provisions
that companies have voluntarily adopted. This Part highlights a shift
from clawbacks apparently aimed at deterrence of financial misreporting to prevention of unjust enrichment. Part III considers from several
perspectives how clawback payments should ideally be taxed and concludes that the optimal regime would allow executives full recovery of
taxes previously paid on returned funds. Part IV explores the current
taxation of clawed back compensation. It argues that full recovery of
taxes previously paid on clawed back compensation should be available
under I.R.C. @ 1341 for executives who are not culpable, but that there
is a great deal of uncertainty, including uncertainty resulting from the
enactment of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act. Part V briefly pulls together

11.

Infra Part IV.B.
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the previous Parts, arguing that, while the most probable tax treatment
under @ 1341 is roughly consistent with clawback rationales, a tax
regime ensuring full offset of previously paid tax would be superior.
Part VI briefly considers two other possible responses to asymmetric
tax treatment of clawbacks: increased use of deferred compensation
and associated issues under I.R.C. @ 409A and the possibility of reducing an executive's future compensation in lieu of actually clawing back
compensation. Part VII concludes and very briefly highlights the political economy impediments to enacting legislation that would ensure
full recovery of taxes previously paid on recouped compensation.
II. CLAWBACK PROVISIONS: SOURCES, DESIGN, AND RATIONALES

This Part provides a brief look into the sources, design, and rationales
behind executive pay clawbacks. First, I explore the clawback regimes
mandated under SOX, the Troubled Asset Relief Program under the
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (TARP), and DoddFrank. Then I consider the features of clawback arrangements voluntarily adopted by public companies. Finally, I consider rationales for
clawback adoption or imposition, both what Congress and firms have
said in adopting clawbacks and what the design elements implicitly tell
us about rationales. The rationales matter when it comes to thinking
about the appropriate clawback tax rules, and I will argue that more
recent clawback regimes reflect a shift in focus from curtailing financial misreporting to preventing unjust enrichment of executives.
A. Clawback Legislation
Over the last twenty years, three pieces of federal legislation have been
enacted that impose executive pay clawback obligations on public companies: SOX,12 TARP,13 and Dodd-Frank.14 The clawback provisions in
these statutes vary in terms of the events that trigger a clawback obligation, the population of executives that is covered, the types of compensation that are included, the amount of compensation that may be
clawed back, and enforcement mechanisms.

12. SOX, supra note 1, § 304.
13. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L.
No. 110-343, tit. I, 122 Stat. 3765, 3767 (2002) [hereinafter TARP].
14. Dodd-Frank, supra note 2, § 954.
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1. SOX
Enacted in the wake of accounting frauds at Enron, Worldcom, and
other firms, SOX @ 304 provides that, in the event of an accounting
restatement due to material noncompliance with financial reporting
requirements resulting from misconduct, an issuer's CEO and CFO
"shall reimburse the issuer for any bonus or other incentive-based or
equity-based compensation received" by the CEO or CFO within the
12-month period following the filing of the financial statement that
gave rise to the restatement and to profits on company stock sold within
the same period." Misconduct on the part of the CEO/CFO is not
required to trigger the SOX clawback; it is sufficient that some misconduct within the organization led to restatement. 16
The SOX clawback reaches any incentive or equity-based compensation received by a restating firm's CEO/CFO within the prescribed period, not just the excess pay attributable to the erroneous
financial report. However, there is no private right of action under SOX
@ 304. Enforcement is solely in the hands of and at the discretion of the
SEC. That discretion was used somewhat sparingly during the first five
to ten years following SOX enactment, but the SEC apparently has
increased @ 304 enforcement activities in recent years, in some cases
holding CEOs and CFOs strictly liable for accounting fraud occurring
on their watch."
2. TARP
Between 2008 and 2014, in the wake of the 2007/2008 financial crisis,
the Treasury purchased "troubled" assets from a number of major
financial institutions and held ownership stakes in these institutions.

15. SOX, supra note 1, § 304(a).
16. SEC v. Jensen, 835 F.3d 1100 (9th Cir. 2016); see also SEC v.
Jenkins, 718 F. Supp. 2d 1070 (D. Ariz. 2010); Anne E. Moran, Reasonable
Compensation, 390-6th TAX MGMT. PORT. (BNA) § XIV.A, at n.712.
17. Stuart Gelfond & David Hennes, Sarbanes-Oxley Section 304:
A Sharper Tool in the Enforcement Toolbox, CORP. BOARD MEMBER MAG., 2d
qtr., 2010 (noting that the SEC brought only 10 enforcement actions under
§ 304 between 2002 and 2008 and that these actions all involved CEO or CFO
misconduct but highlighting the SEC's later adoption of "a more expansive
view of liability").

Executive Pay Clawbacks and Their Taxation
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During the period in which the U.S. was directly invested in these
institutions, TARP @ 111 directed the Treasury Secretary to require
that the institutions adopt certain corporate governance and compensation policies, including "a provision for the recovery by the financial
institution of any bonus or incentive compensation paid to a senior
executive officer based on statements of earnings, gains, or other criteria that are later proven to be materially inaccurate." 18
The TARP clawback applied to the top five most highly compensated executives of public and private companies. 19 Unlike the SOX
clawback, the TARP clawback was not predicated on misconduct.
Moreover, it was not predicated explicitly on an accounting restatement, although presumably situations in which earnings are later
proven to be inaccurate would generally correspond with restatements.
It is somewhat unclear whether a clawback of a bonus "based on" an
inaccurate statement of earnings would entail recovery of the entire
bonus or only of the portion of the bonus associated with the overreported earnings. In any event, now that all TARP positions have been
unwound, the TARP clawback is no longer in force.
3. Dodd-Frank
A much more expansive clawback mandate was promulgated in DoddFrank @ 954. That section, codified as @ IOD of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (SEA), requires the SEC to direct the national securities
exchanges to prohibit the listing of any security of an issuer that fails to
adopt a clawback policy with certain features or to properly disclose
that policy.
Dodd-Frank compliant clawbacks are triggered by financial
restatements arising from material noncompliance with financial
reporting requirements and require issuers to "recover from any . ..
current and former executive officer(s) [of the issuer] who received
incentive-based compensation (including stock options awarded as
compensation) during the three-year period" preceding the restatement
the amount of that compensation in excess of the amount that would

18.
19.

TARP, supra note 13, § 111(b)(2)(B).
Id. § 111(b)(3).

532
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have been paid but for the erroneous financials. 20 This is a no-fault
clawback that applies irrespective of any misconduct.
Dodd-Frank @ 954 is not self-implementing but requires an
SEC rule. The SEC proposed such a rule, 10D-1, in 2015. The proposed
rule tracks @ 954, of course, and expands upon and explains its various
provisions, detailing, for example, exactly which executives and what
types of compensation are subject to the clawback' and how firms
should go about determining the amount of excess compensation to be
clawed back following a restatement. 22
Proposed rule 10D-1 has not yet been implemented. The Financial CHOICE Act of 2017 would have amended SEA @ IOD to limit the
application of the Dodd-Frank clawback to "such executive officer[s
who] had control or authority over the financial reporting that resulted
in the accounting restatement," 23 but the CHOICE Act did not become
law. Presumably, the SEC will soon finalize the Dodd-Frank clawback
rules. In a 2018 speech, then SEC Chairman Jay Clayton noted the
"serial" approach the SEC was taking with respect to the rollout of the
Dodd-Frank executive pay mandates, his satisfaction with the DoddFrank mandated CEO pay ratio rules adopted in 2015, and discussions
within the commission regarding "how best to address the remaining
mandatory executive compensation rules," i.e., the Dodd-Frank clawback provision.24
B. Employer-InitiatedClawbacks
The number of U.S. public companies voluntarily adopting clawback
policies has increased dramatically over the last two decades. Babenko,
Bennett, Bizjak, Coles, and Sandvik (BBBCS) analyzed data gleaned
from proxy statements of S&P 1500 companies between 2000 and

20. Dodd-Frank, supra note 2, § 954, codified at Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 § 1OD(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j-4.
21. SEC Release, supra note 3, at 32, 38.
22. SEC Release, supra note 3, at 58.
23. Financial CHOICE Act of 2017, H.R. 10, 115th Cong. § 849
(2017).
24. Jay Clayton, SEC Chairman, Opening Remarks at the Securities Regulation Institute (Jan. 22, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech
/speech-clayton-012218 [https://perma.cc/UT6J-DE4Q].
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2013.25 They found that through 2004, less than 1% of the S&P 1500
had implemented a clawback policy, but that in 2013 the fraction had
grown to 62%.26
The terms of these employer-initiated clawbacks are heterogeneous. BBBCS found that firms often report multiple, independent
clawback triggers but thatthe most popular triggers are earnings restatements (included as a trigger by 77% of firms with a clawback), misconduct (52%), fraud (310o), and violation of a non-compete agreement
(27%).27 Of the clawback provisions that addressed coverage, 56% of
firms extended clawbacks to executives beyond the "top 5."28 Sixty-nine
percent of firms limit clawback obligations to executives directly
responsible for a triggering event, while 31% extend clawback obligations to executives who are not directly responsible. 29 There is also heterogeneity with respect to the amount of compensation covered by the
clawback. Most commonly, the full amount of a cash bonus or equitybased award may be recouped if a clawback provision is triggered, but a
substantial minority of firms (ranging from 39% to 45%, depending on
the type of compensation) limit clawbacks to the gains associated with
the restated financials, fraud, misconduct, etc. 30 Employer-initiated
clawback policies generally are overseen by a firm's compensation committee or the entire board of directors, and in a majority of cases the
overseer has the discretion to determine whether a triggering event has
occurred and the amounts to be recouped, if any.31
Apparently, companies have only occasionally enforced voluntarily adopted clawback policies. BBBCS identified 272 instances
in which a company restated earnings after adopting a clawback

25. BBBCS, supra note 4, at 42. The S&P 1500 data was compiled
by Incentive Lab, now an arm of Institutional Shareholder Services. BBBCS
also analyzed data from a larger sample of companies included in the Compustat database and found a similar increase over a broader time frame. Id.
26. Id. at 42 fig.2. As noted above, a recent report indicates that
over 90% of the 100 largest firms have disclosed the adoption of some form of
clawback policy. Agen, supra note 5.
27. BBBCS, supra note 4, at 45 tbl.2 panel B. Clawbacks predicated on violation of non-compete, non-solicitation, non-disclosure or similar
contractual obligations are known in the industry as "bad boy" clawbacks.
28. Id. at 46 tbl.2 panel C.
29. Id. at 46 tbl.2 panel D.
30. Id. at 46 tbl.2 panel E.
31. Id. at 47 tbl.2 panels G, H.
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provision and only 5 instances in which the board disclosed that the
company sought to recoup compensation. 32 They identified 3 other
instances more recently. 33 They also note, however, that in some cases
compensation may be "voluntarily" returned, avoiding the need to formally trigger a clawback policy.34
C. Clawback Rationales
Clawback provisions might be mandated legislatively or adopted by
firms voluntarily for a number of reasons. These reasons fall into two or
perhaps three broad categories-an attempt to influence executive
behavior ex ante, the prevention of unjust enrichment ex post, and compliance with investor wishes/best practices. And, of course, these rationales need not be mutually exclusive. We can learn something about the
reasons for clawback adoption from legislative histories or discussions
in proxy statements, but arguably the most persuasive evidence of purpose is provided by the design of a particular clawback provision.
1. SOX
Under SOX @ 302, public company CEOs and CFOs are required to
certify the accuracy and completeness of their annual and quarterly
financial reports and the adequacy of internal controls. The clawback
provision under SOX @ 304 backs up the certification requirement by
placing CEO and CFO compensation at risk. Promulgated in the wake
of massive frauds at Enron, Worldcom, and other issuers, these provisions clearly were intended to reduce such fraud by reducing the incentive of these senior executives to misstate their financials in order to
increase incentive compensation payouts. 35 The design of the SOX

32. Id. at 29.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 30. Anecdotal evidence suggests that clawback
are becoming more aggressive, evolving, for example, from "double
policies that required a restatement and unethical conduct to policies
low the Dodd-Frank blueprint and are triggered solely by financial

ments. See Trigger Happy: Will Clawback Offenses Grow?,

policies
trigger"
that folrestate-

KORN FERRY,

https://www.kornferry.com/insights/articles/ceo -compensation-clawback
[https://perma.cc/U5FR-28WU] (last visited May 31, 2021).
35. The report of the House Committee on Financial Services
made it clear that its intent was to limit disgorgement to cases in which
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clawback reinforces the view that behavioral modification was a significant goal. The mandate extends only to restatements arising from misconduct. Clawback exposure is limited to the CEO and CFO-the two
executives with the most influence over a firm's financial reporting
quality. And SOX clawbacks are not limited to excess compensation
associated with a restatement. The entirety of incentive pay received
within a specified window is at risk as well as profits from share sales
during this period. When invoked by the SEC, the SOX clawback is a
sledgehammer.
To be sure, even the SOX clawback design suggests some
attention to ex post unjust enrichment. A CEO or CFO can be forced to
disgorge incentive pay or trading profits even if he or she was completely unaware of the financial reporting misconduct of a subordinate.
This feature appears to reflect President George W. Bush's 2002 recommendation that "CEOs or other officers should not be allowed to
profit from erroneous financial statements." 36 But, of course, as CEOs
and CFOs ultimately are responsible for the quality of their firms'
financial reporting, explicitly so after the enactment of SOX @ 302,
enforcing a clawback against them in cases of misconduct within their
firms without evidence of personal misconduct is also consistent with a
desire to maximize the pressure on these individuals to ensure compliance throughout the ranks, an ex ante deterrence rationale.
2. Dodd-Frank
The structure of the Dodd-Frank clawback provision and the DoddFrank's legislative history suggest an increased emphasis on ex post
unjust enrichment relative to ex ante behavioral modification, at least
as compared to the SOX clawback. In its analysis of Dodd-Frank @ 954,

"extreme misconduct" by an executive was provable. But the Senate version
of the bill was enacted, and the report of the Senate Banking Committee was
ambiguous with respect to scienter. See Kelsh, supra note 6, at 1017-19. Either
way, it seems clear that the underlying rationale for § 304 was to combat
accounting fraud.
36. Fact Sheet: CorporateFraudConference Sponsored by President's CorporateFraudTask Force, GEORGE W. BUSH WHITE HOUSE (Sept. 26,
2002), https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/09
/20020926-2.html [https://perma.cc/E2FA-QPBD] (detailing the President's
"Ten-Point Plan to Improve Corporate Responsibility and Protect America's
Shareholders," announced on March 7, 2002).
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the Senate Banking Committee explained that clawback provision
"requires public companies . .. to recover money that they erroneously
paid in incentive compensation to executives as a result of material
noncompliance with accounting rules. This is money that the executive
would not have received if the accountingwas done properly and was
not entitled to." 37 The committee further expressed its belief that "it is
unfair to shareholders for corporations to allow executives to retain
compensation that they were awarded erroneously."38 The Committee
report says nothing about deterring misreporting or other aberrant
behavior.
To be sure, the Senate Banking Committee report on DoddFrank @ 954 consists of only two paragraphs. Behavioral modification
might have been an unspoken rationale for adoption, but the structure
of @ 954 also is consistent with the stated rationale of avoiding unjust
enrichment and unfairness. Recall that the Dodd-Frank clawback is a
strict liability, no-fault provision. It applies to a sizeable group of executives, not just executives with control or influence over financial reporting. And most importantly, under Dodd-Frank, it is only the unearned
portion of compensation that is clawed back.
A number of commentators have criticized the Dodd-Frank
clawback provision as being poorly designed to address incentives to
misstate financial results. Professor Bainbridge labeled Dodd-Frank
"[q]uack [f]ederal [c]orporate [g]overnance [r]ound II,"39 and argued
that the Dodd-Frank clawback provision was over-inclusive since it
"encompasses all executive officers, without regard to their responsibility or lack thereof for the financial statement in question."4 Similarly, Professor Fried has argued that the "SEC's proposed Dodd-Frank
clawback reaches too many executives," since clawing back compensation from executives below the "top 5" "cannot be expected to reduce
[financial] misreporting." 1 And Professors Bank and Georgiev have
argued that the Dodd-Frank clawback is overbroad in reaching a "large

37. S. REP. No. 111-176, at 135 (2010) (emphasis added).
38. Id. at 136.
39. Bainbridge, supra note 6, 1779-80 (echoing Professor Roberto
Romano's reference to SOX as "quack corporate governance" in Roberta
Romano, The Sarbanes-OxleyAct and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521 (2005)).
40. Bainbridge, supra note 6, at 1806.
41. Fried, supra note 6, at 6.
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class of executives" and applying "irrespective of whether fraud
occurred or who was at fault." 4 2
But these appear to be more criticisms of Congress's apparent
objective in enacting the Dodd-Frank clawback than of the clawback
design per se. The reach of the Dodd-Frank clawback is reasonable if
the goal is to prevent unjust enrichment of executives arising from the
confluence of incentive pay and accounting restatements. And this is
an objective that the SEC took seriously. The SEC cites the Banking
Committee's statement of purpose numerous times in its proposed
rulemaking. For example, in justifying mandated pro rata recovery
among executives participating in "pool plans," the SEC stated its
belief "that permitting [board of director] discretion in these instances
would be inconsistent with Section lOD's no-fault standard and its goal
of preventing executive officers from retaining compensation to which
they are not entitled under the restated financial reporting measure."4 3
Given an objective of avoiding unfairness and unjust enrichment, the SEC's proposal to interpret "executive officer" under DoddFrank @ 954 consistently with the definition of "executive officer"
under SEA @ 16 (that is to say broadly, rather than narrowly limiting
the population to "top 5" executives) seems perfectly reasonable.44 Such

42. Bank & Georgiev, supra note 6, at 24.
43. SEC Release, supra note 3, at 74.
44. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(a) requires "a director or
an officer" to register with the SEC and to report all trades in equity securities
of their issuer. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a). These individuals are also subject to the
"short-swing" trading rule under § 16(b) that allows for disgorgement on a
no-fault basis of profits derived by these individuals on trades of company
securities within a six-month window. Section 16 does not define "director or
an officer," but the term has been interpreted by the SEC, in part, as follows:
The term 'officer' shall mean an issuer's president, principal financial officer, principal accounting officer (or, if there
is no such accounting officer, the controller), any vicepresident of the issuer in charge of a principal business unit,
division or function (such as sales, administration or
finance), any other officer who performs a policy-making
function, or any other person who performs similar policymaking functions for the issuer.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Rule § 16a-1(f), 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-1(f).
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a definition is underinclusive, if anything, as it fails to require recoupment from non-executive employees who have received inflated compensation as a result of financial misreporting, but Congress limited
the reach of @ 954 to "executive officers," not all employees, and the
SEC must live within that constraint.
Given increasing concerns in recent years about growing wealth
inequality, and particularly growing inequality between the super
wealthy and the merely well off, Congress's focus on unjust enrichment
and unfairness in promulgating a mandatory clawback of unearned
executive pay in Dodd-Frank seems highly prescient. Legislators seeking to avoid unjust enrichment of corporate executives might also have
been motivated by underlying concerns with improving investor confidence in U.S. public companies and the security markets more generally. And these would all be plausible goals underlying a mandatory,
no-fault clawback provision since individual companies would be
unlikely to take into account broad public concerns such as these in
deciding whether or how to enforce discretionary clawback policies. 45
3. Employer-Initiated Clawbacks
Not surprisingly, the rationales firms provide for adopting clawbacks
differ somewhat from the rationales of legislators. 46 BBBCS report data
on reasons stated in proxy statements for clawback adoption. Some are
chiefly administrative-the clawback was adopted as part of a larger
compensation plan (25% of firms) or as part of an employment agreement (13%)-but other reasons provided were more substantive-to
mitigate excessive risk taking (13% of firms). 47 Ten percent of firms
cited SOX as a reason for adopting a clawback provision, although

45. While endorsing no-fault clawbacks, Professors Murphy and
Jensen have argued that boards of directors should have more discretion than
that provided by the Dodd-Frank provision to determine whether to pursue
clawbacks. Murphy & Jensen, supra note 6, at 41 (noting the difficulty of pursuing clawbacks from employees who have paid taxes on compensation). But
in my view, Murphy and Jensen underestimate how reticent boards will be to
pursue clawbacks absent a mandate. See BBBCS, supra note 4 (providing evidence that boards rarely enforce voluntarily adopted clawback policies).
46. As suggested above, we would not expect companies to focus
on systemic issues, such as improving investor confidence in the securities
markets generally, in deciding whether to voluntarily adopt a clawback policy.
47. BBBCS, supra note 4, at 45 tbl.2 panel A.
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SOX does not require firms to do so, and another 10% cited DoddFrank, suggesting that these firms were getting ahead of the curve.4 8 A
number of firms cited improved corporate governance (9%), improved
executive/shareholder alignment (40o), or best practices (2%) as rationales for adoption. 4 9
Although not explicitly provided as a rationale, a number of
firm-initiated clawbacks are intended at least in part to enforce contractual agreements. Twenty-seven percent of firms that detailed clawback
triggers listed violation of a non-compete as a trigger.50 Another 16%
listed violation of a non-solicitation agreement and 16% listed violation
of a non-disclosure agreement as clawback triggers." The adoption of
these "bad-boy" triggers suggests that preventing these behaviors is a
goal of many voluntarily adopted clawback policies.
According to BBBCS's evidence, firms do not expressly state
that they are adopting clawbacks in an effort to minimize the rewards to
and amount of financial misreporting or to avoid the unjust enrichment
of their executives, but their stated rationales are not inconsistent with
these justifications either. It is intriguing that 13% of firms report mitigating excessive risk taking as a rationale. This could be an oblique reference to "aggressive" financial reporting or could refer to aggressive
business positions or both. This point is explored further in the following
Part. In sum, however, the evidence, such as it is, supports a range of
predictable rationales for mandating or voluntarily adopting clawbacks,
including mitigation of financial misreporting or excessive risk taking,
penalizing contractual breaches, and prevention of unjust enrichment.
III. OPTIMAL CLAWBACK TAXATION

As we will see momentarily, employee income taxes can consume up
to 50% of executive compensation. As a result, the tax treatment of
clawed back compensation takes on real importance. This Part will
focus on the optimal tax treatment of clawbacks from several perspectives and will argue that the optimal regime would be one in which any
taxes paid on compensation prior to its being clawed back would be
fully refunded.

48.
49.
50.
51.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 45 tbl.2 panel B.
Id.
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A. Overview of Compensation Taxation: What's at Stake?
The tax consequences of clawbacks can be significant, but they vary
depending on the type and timing of compensation subject to a clawback obligation. This Subpart provides a general overview of compensation taxation as a prelude to consideration of an optimal clawback tax
regime.
Consider this paradigm case. An executive receives a $1 million cash bonus in 2019. The bonus is ordinary income that we will
assume is taxed at the current maximum federal rate of 37%.52 If the
executive works in a high tax state like New York or California, she will
pay state income tax at rates approaching 10% or more. 53 Medicare tax
adds another 2.35% for high-income employees." In total, because the
compensation is ordinary income, the employee tax burden can approach
or even exceed 50% of the bonus payment." Unless the deduction is
barred by I.R.C. @ 162(m), 56 the employer should be entitled to deduct

52. Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054, § 11001 (2017) [hereinafter
TCJA]. This act is colloquially known as the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act.
53. The maximum marginal tax rate on personal income in New
York is 8.82%. Tax Year 2019 New York Income Tax Brackets, TAX-BRACKETS
.ORG, https://www.tax-brackets.org/newyorktaxtable [https://perma.cc/AU26
-6K45] (last visited May 31, 2021). The maximum marginal rate in California
is 13.3%. Tax Year 2019 CalforniaIncome Tax Brackets, TAX-BRACKETS.ORG,
https://www.tax-brackets.org/californiataxtable [https://perma.cc/S8CF-6ZVN]
(last visited May 31, 2021).
54. Employees pay a 1.45% Medicare tax on all compensation.
High-income employees pay an additional 0.9%. Soc. SEC. ADMIN. PuB. No.
05-10024, UNDERSTANDING THE BENEFITS 3 (2021), https://www.ssa.gov/pubs
/EN-05-10024.pdf [https://perma.cc/E4RW-UJYU]. Employers also pay
1.45% Medicare tax on all wages, id., and it is generally understood that the
incidence of the employer-paid Medicare tax falls on employees. This may or
may not be true for executive bonuses, but the taxes executives bear on
bonuses are very large either way.
55. Under the TCJA, state taxes are only deductible up to $10,000.
TCJA, supra note 52, § 11042. For a high-income executive, the state tax on a
bonus would be non-deductible in practice, and thus the federal, state, and
Medicare rates can be added to generate a combined effective rate.
56. Prior to the enactment of the TCJA, compensation of a public
company's "top five" executives beyond $1 million per executive per year was
not deductible unless it was performance based, but the cash and equity-based
bonuses at issue here could easily have been structured to ensure full
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the $1 million payment, but the point is that the tax dollars at stake are
very significant.
If we substitute a bonus paid in stock worth $1 million, the tax
result is exactly the same. The timing of taxation of equity pay is more
complex, but when a stock grant vests or an option is exercised, the
gains generally are taxed to the recipient as ordinary income," and the
employer is entitled to an equivalent deduction. 58
Now suppose that the executive is required to return the cash
bonus or equity compensation in 2020. If the employer was able to
deduct the bonus when paid, it will generally be required to include the
amount recouped in income and will pay tax on that amount. The
employer, in other words, will generally face no net tax consequences
from having paid and recouped a bonus. But will the executive be able
to deduct the repayment or receive a credit for tax paid in 2019? If not,
the executive could face a net cost of $500,000 for the privilege of holding $1 million in cash or stock worth $1 million for a year. This critical
question is the subject of Part IV.s 9

deductibility. See I.R.C. § 162(m)(4) (2016). Today, given the TCJA, public
company top five executive pay in excess of $1 million per year is not deductible, full stop. TCJA, supra note 52, § 13601(a).
57. There are exceptions. Recipients of restricted stock may make
an election under I.R.C. § 83(b) to include the value of the stock in income at
grant rather than at vesting, but, because the tax paid at grant cannot be recovered if the stock fails to vest, § 83(b) elections by employees of companies
with publicly traded stock are rare. See David I. Walker, Is Equity Compensation Tax Advantaged?, 84 B.U. L. REV. 695, 707 (2004) (citing interview evidence). Gains arising from Incentive Stock Options (ISOs) are taxed when a
recipient sells the underlying shares rather than upon option exercise (see
I.R.C. § 421(a)), but limitations on the grant of ISOs result in these options
being economically insignificant relative to "nonqualified" stock options.
See, e.g., Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, The Taxation ofExecutive Compensation, 14 TAX POL'Y & ECON. 1, 7 (2000) (reporting that ISOs account for
about 5% of compensatory options).
58. Again, unless the deduction is barred by I.R.C. § 162(m).
59. Another possibility, considered in Part VI below, is that the
company reduces the executive's 2020 compensation by $1 million in lieu of
requiring the executive to return the 2019 $1 million bonus. But it is likely
that this technique would have the same tax consequences as explicit repayment.
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In some instances, however, compensation subject to a clawback may not have been taxed in the first instance, eliminating any tax
issue upon recoupment. Suppose, for example, that the executive
received her $1 million bonus in February 2019 and that the bonus was
returned in October 2019 as a result of an intervening accounting
restatement. Assuming that the executive employs the calendar year as
her fiscal year, this pair of transactions would have no income tax consequences as both occurred during the same tax year.60 The combination of transactions would yield a "tax nothing."
Alternatively, suppose that the executive made an election in
2018 to defer any cash bonus received in 2019 until retirement under
her firm's nonqualified deferred compensation plan. In this case, the
executive would not pay income tax on the bonus when earned in 2019,
and her employer would not be entitled to a deduction in that year.61
The deferred bonus would normally be taxed to the executive and
deducted in the year of payment, but if clawed back in 2020 (or at any
point before payment), there would be no tax consequences arising
from the transactions; again a tax nothing.6 2
There are other situations in which incentive compensation
would not have been taxed prior to being clawed back in a future year.
Suppose a firm awards performance shares to their executives under
the following terms: The number of shares awarded will be determined
based on the firm's average earnings performance over the 2015-2018
period, but the shares awarded will not vest in the executives, i.e.,
become owned outright, until 2021.63 The executive is awarded 10,000
shares in 2019 based on reported earnings for the three-year period.
Because the shares are unvested, they are not included in income at
that time. In 2020, the firm restates earnings for 2017-2018. Given the
downward revision, the executive should have received 8,000 shares.

60. Penn v. Robertson, 115 F.2d 167, 175 (4th Cir. 1940) ("rescission" of money received "before the close of the calendar year[] extinguished
what otherwise would have been taxable income").
61. Robert A. Miller, NonqualifiedDeferred Compensation Plans,
in EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 211, 268-69 (Yale D. Tauber & Donald R. Levy
eds., 2002).
62. A clawback of deferred compensation may present problems
under I.R.C. § 409A. See infra Part VI.
63. Alternatively, the shares may be designed to vest in 2018 with
payout deferred until 2021. In order to defer income tax application until 2021,
such a deferral would have to comport with the rules of § 409A.
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Two thousand shares are recouped. There is no need or basis for a tax
deduction or credit. From a tax perspective, this is equivalent to the
executive having received 8,000 unvested shares to begin with.64
These last two examples are important because they highlight
potential inequities and dynamic effects arising from the tax rules
applicable to clawbacks. Most large public companies have elective
deferred compensation programs. 65 If it turns out that the receipt and
repayment of a non-deferred cash bonus results in adverse net consequences for an executive, two similarly situated executives could face
very different clawback tax consequences depending on whether they
elect to defer bonuses. Similarly, many companies make performance
awards comparable to that outlined in the paragraph above but deliver
vested (and taxed) shares at the end of the three-year performance
period. In this situation, the tax treatment of clawed back shares would
be important, and that tax treatment might influence the design of performance awards.
Now that we have a sense of what's at stake, we can consider
the optimal tax treatment of clawed back compensation and then evaluate the current tax rules against that benchmark. But before we do, it
will be helpful to briefly consider who bears the cost of clawbacks and
the taxes on clawed back compensation.

64. This is essentially the SEC's example in its proposed rulemaking. See SEC Release, supra note 3, at 54-55.
65. Approximately three quarters of large companies offer nonqualified deferred compensation programs currently. See Doug Frederick
et al., Executive Benefits Within the Responsible Executive Compensation
Framework, MERCER 2 (2016), https://www.mercer.com/content/dam/mercer
/attachments/global/Talent/executive -reward-perspectives/2016/gl-2016
-executive -benefits -within-the -responsible -executive -compensation
-framework-mercer.pdf [https://perma.cc/N6NN-RZ6V] (reporting that 72%
of Fortune 500 companies offered nonqualified savings plans in 2016); Newport Grp., Executive Benefits: A Survey of Current Trends 13 (2014/2015 ed.)
(noting that 72% of Fortune 1000 companies offered a nonqualified savings
plan in 2013); see also Rebecca Moore, Employers Want to Boost NQDC Plan
Participation,PLAN ADVISOR (Aug. 14, 2014), https://www.planadviser.com
/employers-want-to-boost-nqdc-plan-participation/ [https://perma.cc/36B2-9GPL]
(describing Newport Group survey).
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B. Clawback and Clawback Tax Incidence
Who bears the cost of clawed back compensation and of any net tax
obligation resulting from the receipt and repayment of clawed back
compensation? Executives bear these costs in the first instance, but, as
a class, executives are unlikely to ultimately bear 100% of these costs.
Under any conception of the executive pay-setting process, one would
expect executives subjected to clawbacks to demand and receive compensation for the increased riskiness of their pay.66 And, indeed, empirical
evidence indicates that clawback adoption leads to increased compensation for executives. 67 Moreover, presumably, executives would demand
to be compensated for incurring net tax obligations on compensation
they are forced to disgorge, shifting at least part of the tax burden onto
shareholders.
Thus, companies and their shareholders should expect to bear
a significant portion of these costs. 68 And so, the tax treatment of

&

66. The two leading, non-mutually exclusive, theories of the executive pay-setting process are the optimal contracting theory and the rent
extraction theory. The optimal contracting view posits that executive pay
arrangements are selected to minimize managerial agency costs and maximize shareholder value. See John E. Core et al., Executive Equity Compensation and Incentives: A Survey, FRBNY ECON. POL'Y REV., Apr. 2003, at 27,
27-28. The managerial power view posits that executive pay arrangements
reflect agency costs, as well as combat them, and that compensation design is
not consistent with shareholder value maximization. Under this view, the
threat or reality of investor and financial press outrage plays an important role
in disciplining compensation, and, as a result, executives and directors seek
out low salience channels of pay and other means of camouflaging compensation to minimize outrage. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Jesse M. Fried
David I. Walker, ManagerialPower and Rent Extraction in the Design of
Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 789 (2002).
67. See Ilona Babenko et al., Internet Appendix to Accompany
"Clawback Provisions and Firm Risk" 1-2 (Apr. 30, 2019) (on file with
author) [hereinafter BBBCS, InternetAppendix] (finding that clawback adoption at S&P 1500 companies leads to an average increase in aggregate top 5
executive pay of more than $300,000 per year).
68. These costs may well be justified if they reduce overall agency
costs, just as the cost of the external audit function may be justified.
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clawback payments isn't just a concern for executives; it's a concern for
investors generally.69
This is not to suggest, however, that the cost of clawed back
compensation or a net tax liability following a particular clawback
event would be passed on to shareholders dollar for dollar. The idea
here is that executives are likely to be compensated on an expected cost
basis for the risk of a clawback being imposed, but once a clawback is
imposed, the costs likely remain with the executives. Of course, it is
possible that a sympathetic board or compensation committee might
boost executive pay following a particular clawback event, but if the
clawback is significant it would be difficult to make the executives
whole for clawed back compensation without incurring the wrath of
investors.70
It is somewhat more plausible that companies would reimburse
or "gross up" executives for net tax liabilities resulting from particular
clawback events. Although tax gross ups are extremely expensive and
strongly discouraged today by proxy advisory firms and other investor
advocates, companies historically have made executives whole for
taxes imposed with respect to various transactions and perks. 1 This
possibility is further explored in the next Subpart. But to the extent that
executives are compensated ex ante for net tax costs and not grossed up

69. Labor may bear part of the burden as well. See David I. Walker,
Who Bears the Cost of Excessive Executive Compensation (andOther Corporate Agency Costs)?, 57 VILL. L. REV. 653, 654 (2012) (arguing that like corporate income taxes, managerial agency costs are likely borne in part by
suppliers of capital and in part by labor).
70. Suppose, for example, that an executive estimates that there is
a 1 in 20 chance, per year, of a clawback-triggering event that would result in
her being required to return $2 million in comp. The executive might seek
$100,000 per year additional compensation to offset this risk. Assume that the
board boosts her pay by this amount. Now suppose that a triggering event
does occur in 2020 and the executive returns $2 million. Presumably, she
would bear much or all of this cost as shareholders have already paid for this
ex ante and because a $2 million added bonus to cover the clawback would be

difficult to hide or justify.
71. See infra Part III.C.3. Tax gross ups are expensive because the
payments to cover tax obligations are also taxable income, requiring further
taxable payments. At a 50% combined state and federal income tax rate, a
company would need to pay an executive $1 million to fully reimburse her for
a $500,000 tax obligation. Infra Part III.C.3.
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ex post, any adverse tax treatment of clawed back compensation not
only imposes costs on shareholders, it also may result in differential
treatment of similarly situated executives, as discussed above, and, as
discussed below, in excessive reduction of risk and/or distortions to
clawback program design and implementation of executive pay practices more generally.
C. The Optimal Tax Treatment of ClawedBack Compensation
This Subpart considers the optimal tax treatment of repaid compensation in light of the various rationales for clawback mandates or their
voluntary adoption. It takes into account the fact that clawbacks and
the tax treatment of clawback payments have dynamic effects, that
company boards have discretion in the adoption and implementation of
clawbacks and in compensation design, and that tax rules applicable to
clawbacks will impact the use of that discretion. It assumes in the first
instance that executives bear the net tax costs of particular clawback
events but also reconsiders the picture if taxes are grossed up. Ultimately, I conclude that compensation that is paid and subsequently
clawed back ideally should result in zero net tax consequence for executives and employers.
1. Clawback Rationales and Tax
As discussed above, clawback provisions might be mandated or voluntarily adopted in an effort to deter financial misreporting or excessive
risk taking, to encourage compliance with non-compete and other
agreements, or to prevent unjust enrichment. Given that up to 50% of
executive bonuses can be consumed by taxes, the tax treatment of
clawback payments can play an important role in facilitating or undermining the achievement of these goals. In theory, that tax treatment
could range from complete offset of any taxes paid on the recouped
compensation, to no offset, or to something in between.
a. Prevention of Unjust Enrichment
Let us begin where the answer is clearest: no-fault clawbacks of excess
compensation intended to prevent unjust enrichment of executives. I've
argued that the legislative history and the structural details of the
Dodd-Frank clawback are consistent with an unjust enrichment
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rationale.7 2 Under this conception, executives should receive and retain
exactly what they were promised, no more and no less, but the determination of what is owed to an executive should be based on full and
correct information, including any restated financial data. Tax treatment of clawback payments that perfectly offsets the taxation of any
prior inclusion is, I believe, most consistent with an objective of avoiding unjust enrichment.
In its proposed rulemaking under Dodd-Frank, the SEC went to
some length to define and describe how clawback policies should be
designed in order to ensure repayment of "the amount of incentivebased compensation received [by the executive officer or former executive officer] that exceeds the amount of incentive-based compensation
that otherwise would have been received had it been determined based
on the accounting restatement." 3 This is no small task, particularly for
incentive compensation that is awarded based on a firm's artificially
inflated share price that exists prior to a restatement. 74 It would be much
easier to simply require recoupment of all incentive pay received within
some window of a restatement, a la the SOX clawback. The fact that the
Dodd-Frank clawback and many firm-initiated clawback policies are
predicated on recoupment of excess compensation, rather than all incentive compensation associated with a triggering event, suggests a focus
less on punishment than on getting to the right level of compensation.
The SEC's proposed rule also specifies that the determination
of excess compensation is to be made pre-tax, that is, "computed

72. Supra Part II.C.2.
73. SEC Proposed Rule § 1OD-1(b)(1)(iii), SEC Release, supra
note 3, at 180.
74. Fried argues that these are "guesstimate[s]," but this characterization seems extreme. Fried, supra note 6, at 52-54. Presumably, event studies generally can be used to estimate the impact of faulty financials on share
price. Event studies are inexact but are widely used in securities litigation.
See generally Jill E. Fisch et al., The Logic and Limits of Event Studies in
Securities Fraud Litigation, 96 TEX. L. REV. 553 (2018). In its proposed
rulemaking, the SEC discussed the potential use of event studies to determine
excess compensation arising from restatements and also highlighted the difficulties. The SEC will not mandate the use of event studies but plans to "permit an issuer to use any reasonable estimate of the effect of the restatement on
stock price and TSR." SEC Release, supra note 3, at 127.
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without regard to any taxes paid,"" in order to ensure full recovery by
the employer and to reduce the administrative burden of determining
after-tax amounts received by various executives. This makes sense.
Recovery of excess compensation on a pre-tax basis makes the shareholders whole. 76 Assuming no significant change in tax rates, a company's earlier deduction for compensation paid, if any, will be offset by
the inclusion of compensation recouped. So, a company applying the
SEC's proposed rule generally would be made whole, ex post, both
before and after tax."?
Pre-tax recovery of excess compensation also ensures that the
executives subject to the clawback are not unjustly enriched pre-tax.
However, unless repayment results in an exact offset of any taxes paid as
a result of the earlier inclusion, the executives may be unjustly enriched
after tax (if repayment reduces an executive's taxes more than the prior
inclusion increased them) or, more likely, penalized after-tax (if repayment reduces taxes less than the prior inclusion increased them).78
b. Reducing FinancialMisreportingand
"BadBoy" Behaviors
The SOX clawback seems designed to deter financial misreporting by
reducing the expected profit associated with that activity. I've referred
to this clawback as a sledgehammer given that it contemplates the
recovery by an employer of all incentive pay, not just excess pay, associated with triggering restatements as well as recovery of share sale

75. SEC Proposed Rule § 1OD-1(b)(1)(iii), SEC Release, supra
note 3, at 180.
76. That is, recovery makes the shareholders whole on an ex post
basis. Investors may pay for expected clawbacks ex ante through greater compensation.
77. If a deduction was allowed to the employer at the time of payment, the amount recovered will be included in income when recouped. If a
deduction was not allowed per § 162(m), there will be no inclusion upon
recoupment. I.R.C. § 111. Either way, shareholders will be kept whole, ex
post, pre- and post-tax.
78. As discussed supra Part II.B, I assume in Parts III.C.1 & 2 that
investors bear part of the cost of clawbacks and any adverse tax treatment of
clawbacks on an ex ante basis, but that executives bear the cost of particular
clawback events. Another possibility, discussed in Part III.C.3, is that companies gross up executives for the adverse tax consequences of clawbacks.
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profits, not just "excess" profits. 79 Congress apparently wasn't worried
about over-deterrence when it adopted this clawback approach.
Assuming that there is no real risk of over-deterrence, a clawback tax regime providing for full tax offsets, no tax offsets, or anything in between would be consistent with deterrence of financial
misreporting. But is it really appropriate to ignore over-deterrence? In
this case, it probably is. To the extent that the SOX clawback is only
invoked in cases of purposeful financial misreporting, the risk of overdeterrence should be small. The ideal amount of purposeful financial
misreporting is zero. Similarly, to the extent that companies have
adopted "bad boy" clawback provisions to deter executives from violating non-competition, non-solicitation, or non-disclosure agreements,
and companies are not concerned about over-deterrence, these objectives also are supported by any tax treatment of paid and recouped
compensation that is on net neutral or worse than neutral.
c. MitigatingExcess Risk-Taking Incentives
The evidence collected by BBBCS suggests that employer-initiated
clawback policies differ substantially from those specified by SOX and
Dodd-Frank. 80 They find that voluntary clawback adoption is associated with a reduction in risk taking and that the reduction does not
relate purely to financial risk but also to investment risk. 81 As they note,
clawbacks can mitigate imprudent risk taking but can also reduce prudent risk taking. They find, however, that stock market reaction to
clawback adoption is generally positive, suggesting that the market
believes, on average, that the reductions in risk taking induced by clawback adoption are value increasing.8 2
To the extent that risk management is an objective of clawback
adoption, the tax treatment of recoupments again becomes important,
particularly in a world in which income taxes can consume 50% of
incentive pay. There is a real concern that prudent risk taking could be

79. Supra Part IIC.1.
80. Supra Part II.C.3.
81. BBBCS, supra note 4, at 2.
82. BBBCS theorize that clawback adoption can be value enhancing as it may solve a horizon problem that relates to the timing mismatch
between current managerial action and future observable consequences.
Id. at 9.
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inefficiently inhibited if the expected after-tax financial penalty associated with a clawback triggering event is too high. Moreover, because
incentive pay may or may not have been taxed prior to a clawback,
balancing these incentives would be quite difficult under a tax regime
that did not allow for full recovery of taxes paid on compensation
received that is subsequently recouped. Doing so is much more straightforward with full tax offsets.
Consider the following example. A company's board of directors is concerned about risk taking and attempts to balance incentive
pay, which creates risk taking incentives, with clawback policies, that
mitigate excessive risk taking by permitting ex post review of decision
making. The compensation committee determines that the following
scheme best aligns its VP's risk-taking incentives with shareholder
interests: a bonus of $0 to $5 million (after-tax) based on three-year total
shareholder return relative to a peer group of firms with a no-fault clawback of any unearned compensation. The company also has an elective
deferred compensation program in which Valerie VP participates, but
Victor VP does not. At a 50% tax rate, the committee can accomplish its
intended result with respect to both Valerie and Victor by providing a $0
to $10 million pre-tax bonus, if, but only if, full tax offsets are provided
for any clawed back compensation. Suppose, for example, that faulty
financials result in payment of the maximum $10 million bonus in 2019
but that restated financials produced in 2020 support only an $8 million
bonus. Valerie deferred her bonus and has not yet paid tax. She returns
$2 million to company and is left with $8 million pre-tax, and ultimately
$4 million after tax is paid on the bonus at the end of the deferral period.
Victor paid $5 million tax on receipt of his bonus. With full tax offsets,
Victor would receive a $1 million tax refund when he returns $2 million
to Company, also leaving him with $4 million after tax. If no tax offsets
are allowed for recouped compensation, however, Valerie would still net
$4 million, but Victor would net only $3 million.
To be sure, I am somewhat skeptical that firms manage risktaking incentives in precisely this fashion, but the upshot is the same:
full offset of previously paid taxes is most consistent with facilitating a
risk management clawback objective.
2. Fairness, Dynamics Responses, and Other Considerations
While allowing full offset of employee tax previously paid on clawed
back compensation is consistent with the various rationales for clawback imposition or voluntary adoption, it is most strongly dictated by
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an objective of avoiding unjust enrichment of, but not penalizing, executives who receive excess pay as a result of misreported financials.
Once other considerations are taken into account, however, the normative case for full offsets becomes even stronger.
a. Fairness
Fairness in taxation is a big, contested issue. 83 Here, I will focus solely
on two (still controversial) principles, horizontal equity and avoiding
punishment of innocents.
Horizontal equity requires equal taxation of similarly situated
taxpayers.84 This too is a contested concept, 85 but I have in mind only
the desirability of applying consistent taxation to individuals engaged
in economically indistinguishable transactions, an intuitive horizontal
equity, if you will.86 Unless "similarly situated" is defined very narrowly, equal taxation of similarly situated executives subject to a clawback can only be assured under a tax regime that provides for full offset
of previously incurred tax on recouped compensation. Again, the easiest way to see this is to compare the situation of our two executives
who are forced to repay compensation-Valerie and Victor-and who
are identical in every way except that Valerie has elected to defer her
bonus (and the tax on that bonus) until retirement while Victor has not
made that election and has paid tax currently. In a full tax offset regime,
Valerie's repayment will have no tax consequence, since her bonus was
not previously taxed, while Victor will receive a deduction or credit
offsetting his prior tax obligation on the recouped amount. On net, they

83. See Brian Galle, Tax Fairness,65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1323,
1324 (2008) (noting that "[t]he concept of tax fairness is presently in some
disrepute" in academic tax circles). There is agreement that as a society we
"should care about distributive justice" but not much agreement beyond
that. Id.
84. Id. at 1325 & n.3 (citing R.A. Musgrave, In Defense of an
Income Concept, 81 HARV. L. REV. 44, 45 (1967)).
85. Galle, supra note 83, at 1324-25 (discussing critiques of the
horizontal equity principle pressed by Louis Kaplow, Liam Murphy and
Thomas Nagel, and others).
86. As Galle notes, id. at 1326 & n.8, despite the persuasive academic critiques of horizontal equity, the concept continues to exhibit an intuitive and lasting appeal (citing Richard A. Musgrave, Horizontal Equity: A
FurtherNote, 1 FLA. TAX REV. 354, 358 (1993)).
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will face the same tax on the same post-clawback income. Under a
regime providing for no deduction or credit for previously incurred tax,
Valerie would still face no net tax as a result of the bonus award and
recoupment while Victor would incur a net tax obligation of up to 50%
of the recouped bonus. 87
One can also think of fairness in this context as avoiding financial punishment via clawbacks of executives who played no part in
activities leading to earnings restatements. Under an unjust enrichment
perspective, these executives should not profit from the misreported
results, but they should not be penalized either. Under this view, the
case for full tax offsets seems particularly compelling in the context of
no-fault clawbacks enforced against executives with no involvement in
particular misreporting and no overall responsibility for a company's
financial reporting-for example, a vice president of research and
development at a firm that has misreported sales. Under the DoddFrank approach, only excess compensation is recovered from these
executives, which intuitively seems fair. However, without full tax offsets, the executives could face a net tax obligation of up to 50% on
compensation that was received and repaid, which seems intuitively
unfair.88
b. Adoption and Implementation of Clawback Regimes
In the absence of final rule making under Dodd-Frank, the adoption
and implementation of clawback policies is largely at the discretion of
company boards of directors. To be sure, the SEC has the power to
pursue clawbacks against CEOs and CFOs under SOX, and the SEC

&

87. Here, again, I am assuming that executives bear whatever net
tax flows from a particular clawback event. This may not be the case. See
infra Part III.C.3.
88. The equities in this situation remind one of Burnet v. Sanford
& Brooks Co., 282 U.S. 359 (1931). There, the taxpayer incurred deductible
expenses between 1913 and 1916 that exceeded gross income. Subsequently,
the taxpayer collected a judgment related specifically to the prior expenses.
The taxpayer argued that the earlier losses and subsequent recovery should be
netted to determine taxable income. The Supreme Court held that such a
result was inconsistent with annual tax accounting. Of course, Congress
responded to the inherent unfairness of situations like that in Sanford
Brooks by providing for net operating loss deductions. See I.R.C. § 172. Providing full tax offsets for clawback payments would reflect a similar spirit.
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has in recent years become more aggressive in doing so, 89 but even so,
SOX clawbacks are largely confined to the most egregious cases. The
proxy advisory services place some pressure on firms to voluntarily
adopt clawbacks, but the compensation "scorecard" promulgated by
Institutional Shareholder Services, the largest proxy advisory firm,
asks only whether a company maintains a "sufficient" or "rigorous"
clawback policy; it does not prescribe best practices for clawback
design or implementation. 90 If we want firms to adopt comprehensive
clawback policies and to implement them aggressively, or at least evenhandedly, the tax treatment of recouped compensation matters.
Imagine the worst-case clawback tax scenario, from the point
of view of companies and their executives, in which compensation is
taxed to the executives when received but is not deductible or creditable for the executives when recouped. Assuming, reasonably, that the
tax treatment of an employer that recoups compensation will be neutral,91 this tax treatment of the executives would impose a joint
employer/employee tax burden on recouped compensation, and that has
several pernicious effects.92
As discussed above, the net cost associated with such a tax
regime is unlikely to be borne solely by the executives. Executives subjected to such a regime would demand greater compensation to offset
the risk of incurring net tax obligations on compensation they cannot
keep, shifting at least part of the tax burden onto shareholders. But however the net burden is borne in aggregate, a tax regime that fails to provide for full tax offsets for disgorged compensation will discourage the

89. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
90. See United States Proxy Voting Guidelines, ISS GOVERNANCE
45, 51 (Nov. 19, 2020), https://www.issgovernance.com/file/policy/active
/americas/US-Voting-Guidelines.pdf [https://perma.cc/36B4-CMCH] [hereinafter ISS Guidelines].
91. Recouped compensation will be included in the employer's
income only if and to the extent that the compensation was previously
deducted by the employer and the deduction reduced the employer's taxes.
I.R.C. § 111.
92. As Myron Scholes and Mark Wolfson have repeatedly emphasized, the analyst must consider all taxes, all parties, and all costs in evaluating the tax consequences of various rules or transactions. See MYRON S.
SCHOLES ET AL., TAXES AND BUSINESS STRATEGY:

A

PLANNING APPROACH 183 (2d

ed. 2002); Myron S. Scholes & Mark A. Wolfson, Taxes and Employee Compensation Planning, 64 TAXES 824 (1986).
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voluntary adoption of clawback policies and discourage the adoption of
more comprehensive, no-fault policies by adopting companies. 93
Moreover, to the extent that companies have discretion with
respect to implementation within mandated clawback regimes or their
own voluntarily adopted policies, boards or compensation committees
are likely to use that discretion to minimize the scope of executive
clawback obligations in the worst case, no tax offset scenario.
A tax regime that provides for full tax offsets for recouped
compensation would not impose an additional, external cost onto clawback programs. To be sure, executives will still demand to be compensated for the risk of losing compensation due to a clawback, and, in
particular, due to a no-fault clawback triggered by another executive's
error or malfeasance, but taxes would not add to the possible losses
under a full offset tax regime.
c. Impact on CompensationDesign
We should also consider the impact of clawback policies, and the taxation of clawbacks, on executive compensation design, which is certainly subject to board of director/compensation committee discretion.
The interactions are complex, but the bottom line is the same: full tax
offsets will ensure that the tax treatment of clawbacks does not in itself
distort compensation design.
Taxes aside, the existence of a clawback provision, whether
mandated or voluntarily adopted, is likely to impact compensation
design, and perhaps in unpredictable ways. Professors Roberta
Romano, Sanjai Bhagat, and Stephen Bainbridge have argued that the
imposition of clawbacks on incentive compensation likely results in
firms shifting away from incentive compensation in favor of greater
salaries.94 BBBCS find, however, that firm-initiated clawback policies

93. Similarly, to the extent that executives have discretion as to
whether to restate earnings, the imposition of a restatement-triggered clawback will tend to discourage restatement filings, and asymmetric tax treatment of clawbacks will further discourage such filings. See Fried, supra note
6, at 15 (discussing a case in which management's refusal to file a restatement
precluded the application of a SOX clawback provision).
94. See Bainbridge, supra note 6, at 1807 (noting that companies
reduced incentive compensation and increased executive salaries in response
to the SOX clawback and implying that the response to the Dodd-Frank
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are associated with more equity-based incentive pay and more pay
overall.95 One possible explanation for the former association is that
equity pay awards increase the incentive for managers to manipulate
financials in order to increase equity compensation payouts and that
clawbacks offset that incentive to some extent by imposing an ex post
correction when and if such manipulation is uncovered. Equity pay is
more attractive from the shareholders' perspective if manipulation can
be mitigated, and so clawback adoption is associated with more equity
pay, or so this story goes. 96
Notably, the SEC's proposed clawback rules under Dodd-Frank
reach some forms of incentive pay but not others. The SEC's DoddFrank clawback rules would include stock and options that vest based
on satisfaction of a financial reporting goal but would not reach simple
time-vested stock and options. 97 The trend in executive pay design over
the last two decades has involved a shift away from the latter and
towards the former, 98 but adoption of a mandatory, no-fault clawback
rule that incorporates this distinction could potentially reverse this
trend. In my view, this would mark an unfortunate return to less performance sensitive executive compensation.
Limited deductibility of clawback payments that increases the
cost to executives (and indirectly to companies) of recouped pay could
reinforce the shift in favor of increased performance-based pay observed
by BBBCS, or it could encourage companies to shift away from compensation subject to clawbacks, particularly under a mandatory, no-fault
Dodd-Frank clawback regime. It is impossible to predict, but what one

clawback could be similar); Bhagat & Romano, supra note 6, at 366 (reporting
that SOX clawbacks led to a decrease in executive incentive compensation and
an increase in salaries). Professors Fried and Shilon note that the evidence that
Bainbridge, Bhagat, and Romano reference was based on the punitive SOX
clawback and that excess pay clawbacks, such as the Dodd-Frank clawback,
"should not distort pay arrangements." Fried & Shilon, supra note 6, at 747.
95. BBBCS, InternetAppendix, supra note 67, at 2-3.
96. Id. Another possibility noted by BBBCS is that to the extent
that clawback adoption reduces executive risk taking, it may be in the shareholders' interest to increase equity pay to maintain risk-taking incentives. Id.
at 3.
97. See SEC Release, supra note 3, at 47.
98. David I. Walker, The Way We Pay Now: Understandingand
EvaluatingPerformance-BasedExecutive Pay, 1 J.L. FIN. & ACCT. 395, 405-

08 (2016).
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can say with confidence is that a clawback tax regime that allows for
full offset of previously paid tax would not exacerbate any distortions in
compensation design that result from the adoption of clawback rules
per se.
Of course, a more direct response to limited deductibility of
clawback payments would be to design compensation so that it is not
taxed to recipients until after the potential clawback window has closed,
thereby obviating any concern with the offset of previously paid taxes. 99
Recall the earlier example of shares awarded based on 2015-2018 performance that do not vest until 2021. These shares would not be taxed
until 2021 and any restatement of 2015-2018 financials is more likely
than not to have occurred prior to that date.1" Alternatively, limited
deductibility might encourage greater elective deferral of incentive
compensation into nonqualified deferred compensation plans, reducing
the amount of previously taxed compensation subject to being clawed
back." 1 Although these would be distortions induced by limited deductibility, they are not necessarily "bad" distortions. Increased vesting
periods for incentive pay and increased deferred compensation both

99. Another possibility might be for the company to reduce executive pay in a subsequent year by the amount of the clawback in lieu of requiring an executive to repay the clawback amount. One might expect this
approach to eliminate any adverse tax consequences associated with actual
repayment, but this is unlikely to be true. See infra Part VI.B.
100. Studies of restatements reveal that most occur within a halfyear of the end of the period of misreporting and that the median period of
misreporting is between 1.75 and 2.75 years. See Mark Hirschey et al., The
Timeliness of Restatement Disclosures and FinancialReporting Credibility,
42 J. Bus. FIN. & ACCT. 826, 841 (2015) (examining 348 restatements by U.S.
companies between 1997 and 2006 and finding a 2.75 year median length of
the restated period (3 years at the 75th percentile) and a 0.4 year median delay
between the end of the misreported period and restatement (0.6 years at the
75th percentile)); Linda A. Myers et al., Restating Under the Radar?Determinants of Restatement Disclosure Choices and the Related Market Reactions
(Apr. 2013), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1309786
[https://perma.cc/26WJ-3QFJ] (examining 1773 restatements by U.S. companies between 2002 and 2008 and finding a 1.75 year median length of the
restated period (3 years at the 75th percentile) and a 0.5 year median delay
between the end of the misreported period and restatement (0.6 years at the
75th percentile)).
101. This possibility is considered at greater depth infra Part VIA.
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improve long-term alignment between executives and shareholders. But
other distortions might be more subtle and pernicious.
3. The Impact of Tax Gross Ups on the Optimal Tax
Treatment of Clawbacks
Thus far I have assumed that, if executives are compensated for net tax
costs associated with clawed back compensation, they are compensated
ex ante based on the expected net costs and that the executives bear any
tax costs associated with particular clawback events. The ideal tax
treatment of clawed back compensation in this scenario would provide
for full offset of any taxes previously paid on the amount disgorged.
Anything less than full offset results in costs that will be passed on to
investors ex ante and is inconsistent with an unjust enrichment rationale for clawback adoption ex post. Full offset of taxes on clawed back
funds also facilitates the use of clawbacks to manage risk taking incentives, ensures equal tax treatment of similarly situated executives, best
promotes the adoption and robust enforcement of voluntary clawback
programs, and minimizes distortions in executive pay design.
But what if executives are made whole or "grossed up" for any
net tax cost associated with clawed back compensation? Companies
have at times grossed up executives for taxes on golden parachute payments, the value of personal use of company aircraft, and other perks." 2
These gross ups are very expensive, and the proxy advisory firms discourage their use,103 but they persist. One could imagine, in particular,
companies grossing up executives for taxes on clawed back compensation that are not offset on repayment, particularly in the case of no-fault
clawbacks imposed on executives lacking any culpability.

102. See, e.g., David Yermack, Flights of Fancy: CorporateJets,
CEO Perquisites, and Inferior Shareholder Returns, 80 J. FIN. ECON. 211
(2006) (noting tax gross ups on personal use of corporate aircraft); David I.
Walker, Tax Incentives Will Not Close Stock Option Accounting Gap, 96 TAx
NOTES 851, 855 (Aug. 5, 2002) (discussing gross ups for taxes on excess golden
parachute payments).
103. ISS Guidelines, supranote 90, at 43 (listing tax gross-ups as a
"problematic" pay practice); Proxy Paper Guidelines: An Overview of the
Glass Lewis Approach to Proxy Advice, GLASS LEWIS 38 (2020), https://www
.glasslewis.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Guidelines_US.pdf [https://perma
.cc/YFU2-MQWW] (voicing opposition to the adoption of new executive
excise tax gross-ups).
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To be clear, I am not talking about grossing up executives for
the clawback itself. That would be pointless. The whole idea to clawbacks is to ensure that the executives receive the "right" amount of
compensation pre-tax. But by the same token, these executives arguably should not bear a net tax burden on compensation that is returned,
and tax gross ups would achieve this. Indeed, a system in which tax
gross ups were regularly provided to executives for net taxes on clawed
back compensation would eliminate several of the problems or inequities associated with an asymmetric tax regime discussed above. Gross
ups of net clawback taxes would facilitate the balancing of risk-taking
incentives, ensure equal treatment of executives irrespective of their
participation in deferred compensation programs, and avoid punishing
innocent executives required to return compensation." 4
But gross ups would not remedy all of the ills associated with
net tax costs on clawbacks; some it would exacerbate by increasing the
total cost of clawbacks for companies and their executives. If clawbacks resulted in net tax costs and gross ups were anticipated, companies would be further discouraged from voluntarily adopting or
even-handedly enforcing clawback provisions, and clawbacks would
have an even larger distortionary impact on the design of executive
compensation programs.
How expensive are gross ups? To get a sense of the cost, consider the example of an executive who receives a $1 million bonus in
2019 and pays $500,000 in federal and state income taxes. (To keep the
math simple, we will ignore FICA taxes, which would be recovered on
repayment." 5 ) Suppose the bonus is clawed back in 2020 and that there
is no tax credit or deduction for the repayment, such that there is a
$500,000 net tax burden on zero net compensation. Suppose the company commits to making their executives whole for taxes on clawbacks.
Because these gross up payments also are taxable as ordinary income,

104. The basic idea here is that fully grossing up executives on any
net tax obligations arising from clawbacks is equivalent, from the executives'
perspective, to a tax regime providing full offsets. Thus, a number of the benefits associated with a full tax offset regime carry over to a gross up regime.
For example, an innocent executive forced to disgorge a bonus under a nofault clawback provision will be made whole after-tax if her previously paid
taxes on the compensation are fully refunded or if her employer grosses her
up on any net tax obligation arising from asymmetric tax treatment.

105.

See infra note 107.
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at, we will again assume, a 50% rate, the company will need to pay the
executive $1 million to keep her whole after-tax,106 an incredible cost
for issuing and recouping a $1 million bonus.
And so, despite the fact that tax gross ups might "solve" several problems associated with a tax regime that does not provide full
offset for taxes paid on clawed back compensation, in fact, the possibility that companies might gross up executives for these taxes and incur
these costs is actually a compelling argument in favor of full tax offsets
for clawbacks.
IV.

ACTUAL TAX TREATMENT OF CLAWED BACK COMPENSATION

As this Part explores, the actual tax treatment of clawed back compensation does not necessarily align with the full offset ideal. Although
repayments are generally deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses or as business losses, these deductions are of limited
direct use (historically) or no direct use (currently). I.R.C. @ 1341 may
provide for recovery of taxes previously incurred on clawed back pay
in many situations, but @ 1341 relief is imperfect and potentially subject
to adverse IRS interpretation.
A. Deductibility under I.R.C. §§ 162 165
Let us begin with the paradigm case of an executive who receives compensation in an earlier year in accordance with a bonus plan, but who is
required to repay and does repay that compensation in a later year
when it is determined, due to an earnings restatement, that the bonus
was not actually earned. Under the well-settled "claim of right" doctrine, the executive may not amend her federal income tax return for
the earlier year and exclude the repaid compensation, even if the period
for amendment remains open, since in the earlier year, the taxpayer had
an apparent unrestricted right to the compensation.0 7

106. Fifty percent of the $1 million gross up payment will be consumed by tax, leaving $500,000 after tax to offset the $500,000 net employee
tax burden of the clawback.
107. United States v. Lewis, 340 U.S. 590, 591 (1951) (citing N. Am.
Oil Consol. V. Burnet, 286 U.S. 417 (1932)). The facts of Lewis mirror the
typical clawback scenario. Lewis received a $22,000 bonus in 1944 and paid
tax on that amount. In 1946, Lewis was ordered by a state court to return
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However, the taxpayer may be entitled to a deduction in the
year of repayment. It is well established that employment constitutes a
trade or business, such that ordinary and necessary expenses arising
from employment are deductible under I.R.C. @ 162.108 Both court opinions and IRS memoranda have supported deduction of involuntarily
repaid compensation in the year of repayment as an unreimbursed
business expense under @ 162 or as a trade or business loss deductible
under @165(c).109
Clawback payments should be deductible under @@ 162 or 165
even in circumstances in which the taxpayer's malfeasance triggered
the need for the earnings restatement and clawed back compensation.
This situation is analogous to one in which an embezzler is apprehended and repays stolen funds. It is well established that an embezzler
is entitled to deduct repayment, despite the obvious malfeasance."'
Moreover, clawback payments arising from breach of non-competition,
solicitation, or confidentiality agreements are deductible." The only
circumstance in which a clawback payment would not be deductible
under @@ 162/165 would be one in which the payment was deemed

&

$11,000 to his employer after it was determined that the original bonus
amount had been improperly computed. Lewis sued for a refund, which the
Court of Claims allowed. The Supreme Court reversed. The claim of right
doctrine does not apply to FICA taxes, which when overpaid in a previous
year as the result of a clawback provision or otherwise, can be recovered per
I.R.C. § 6413 and the regulations thereunder. There is a three-year statute of
limitations. See Rev. Rul. 79-311, 1979-2 C.B. 25 (holding that § 6413 provides relief for a taxpayer who was required to return compensation advanced
in a previous year that exceeded earned commissions); see also Barker
O'Brien, supra note 6, at 441.
108. Rev. Rul. 79-311, 1979-2 C.B. 25.
109. Oswald v. Comm'r, 49 T.C. 645 (1968) (compulsory repayment of excessive compensation pursuant to pre-existing bylaw was deductible as an ordinary and business expense); Rev. Rul. 82-178, 1982-2 C.B. 59
(repaid "income aid payment" was deductible by employee as a business loss
per § 165(c)(1)).
110. McKinney v. United States, 574 F.2d 1240 (5th Cir. 1978)
(noting that the government did not dispute the taxpayer's deduction of
embezzled fund in the year of repayment).
111. Rev. Rul. 67-48, 1967-1 C.B. 50 (allowing deduction under
§ 165(c)(1) in year of payment of compensation clawed back as a result of taxpayer's breach of an employment contract).
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voluntary, such as a case in which the parties entered into the clawback
agreement after the triggering event." 2 Involuntary clawback payments
should generally be deductible under @@ 162/165.
While deductible, the difficulty for executives faced with clawback obligations is that unreimbursed employee business expenses
under @ 162 and trade or business losses of individuals per @ 165(c)(1)
are deductible only as miscellaneous itemized deductions (MIDs). 113
Prior to 2018, these deductions were allowed but were restricted; beginning in 2018 and through 2025, these deductions are completely disallowed." 4 Luckily, for executives facing clawback obligations, @ 1341
will often provide an alternative path to deduction. But before turning
to that provision, I will briefly explore the limitations on deductibility
of MIDs that applied prior to 2018 and that would potentially apply
after 2025.
Prior to 2018, there were three provisions that potentially limited the usefulness of MIDs. First, under @ 67, MIDs were allowed only
to the extent that the sum of MIDs exceeded 2% of AGI." 5 To get a
sense of the significance of this "haircut," I reviewed the data on the
deductibility of MIDs for high-income taxpayers as compiled in the
IRS's 2016 Statistics of Income. 116 Eighteen percent of returns reporting AGI between $2 and $5 million reported MIDs in excess of the 2%
of AGI threshold.1 17 While these taxpayers would have faced no @ 67

112. Voluntary repayment of compensation would not be considered an ordinary and necessary expense and would not support a deduction.
Blanton v. Comm'r, 46 T.C. 527 (1966).
113. I.R.C. § 67(b).
114. TCJA, supra note 52, § 11045; I.R.C. § 67(g).
115. For example, a taxpayer with AGI of $1 million and MIDs of
$25,000 would be able to deduct only $5,000, as 2% of $1 million is $20,000.
If the same taxpayer had MIDs of $20,000 or less, her MIDs would be completely nondeductible.
116. SOI Tax Stats: Table 2.1: Returns with Itemized Deductions:
Sources of Income, Adjustments, Itemized Deductions by Type, Exemptions,
and Tax Items, by Size ofAdjusted GrossIncome, Tax Year 2016 (FilingYear 2017),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/16in2lid.xls [https://perma.cc/PC7E-ESAR]
[hereinafter 2016 SOI Table 2.1].
117. Id. Compare column 1 (total returns) and column 106 (number
of returns with MIDs in excess of the 2% of AGI floor) for the $2 million to $5
million AGI band. For comparison, the average realized compensation for
"top 5" executives of S&P 1500 companies for 2016 was about $4.1 million.
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"haircut" on an additional deduction for clawed back compensation,
the other 82% of taxpayers would have faced a haircut ranging from 0
to 2% of AGI.
Second, under @ 68, total itemized deductions (after application of various provision-by-provision haircuts) were reduced by an
amount equal to 3% of the excess of AGI over an inflation-adjusted
threshold. For high-income taxpayers, this provision increased effective marginal tax rates, but it would have had little impact on the
deductibility of clawback payments since most high-income taxpayers
had total itemized deductions, without clawback deductions, well in
excess of the reduction amount.118
Third, prior to 2018, MIDs were not deductible for purposes of
the Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT). According to the IRS SOI, 18%
of taxpayers reporting AGI in the $2 million to $5 million band were
subject to the AMT for 2016.119 For these taxpayers, an additional MID,
such as a deduction for a clawback payment, would provide no tax benefit. For the other 82% of taxpayers, the existence of the AMT could
have significantly curtailed the tax benefit associated with a clawback
payment.
In sum, before 2018, the usefulness to a taxpayer of a deduction for a clawback payment as a MID was often quite limited, principally because of the 2% haircut on MIDs and the non-deductibility of
MIDs for purposes of the AMT. The extent to which such a deduction
would have offset the tax impact of the prior year's inclusion would
have been essentially random and unrelated to the justifications for
permitting or denying tax offsets for clawback payments.
With the enactment of the TCJA, the deductibility under
@@ 162/165 of clawback payments is much clearer, and much harsher.
MIDs are simply not deductible under the TCJA for tax years 2018

Author's calculation based on Execucomp data field Total_Alt2, which
includes the value of vested stock and the net value of exercised options.
118. 2016 SOI Table 2.1, supra note 116. Compare column 1 (total
returns) and column 60 (returns with total itemized deductions in excess of
the § 68 limitation). In the $2-$5 million AGI band, those figures are 101,941
and 101,921, indicating that only 20 taxpayers with AGI at this level reported
itemized deductions totaling less than 3% of AGI minus the § 68 threshold.
119. 2016 SOI Table 2.1, supra note 116. Compare column 1 (total
returns) and column 126 (number of returns subject to the AMT) for the $2
million to $5 million AGI band.
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through 2025.120 Absent @ 1341, to which we turn next, an executive
making a clawback payment between 2018 and 2025 would receive no
tax benefit, no offset against the tax incurred when the compensation
was received.
B. Tax Treatment of Clawbacks Under I.R.C.

§ 1341

When it applies, @ 1341 provides a non-miscellaneous itemized deduction or a tax credit for amounts repaid that were previously held under
a claim of right. Executives contractually bound to repay compensation
have successfully invoked @ 1341 to achieve complete recovery of federal income tax previously paid on that compensation. However, @ 1341
may not always provide complete recovery for executives subject to
clawbacks, and there is a non-trivial question as to whether @ 1341 can
be utilized by executives making clawback payments in tax years 2018
through 2025. This Subpart explores the application of @ 1341 to compensation clawbacks.
1. Section 1341 Overview
Under @ 1341, if (1) an item is included in gross income in a prior year
because it appeared that the taxpayer had an unrestricted right to the
item; (2) a deduction is allowable in a subsequent year because it is
determined that the taxpayer did not have an unrestricted right to the
item; and (3) the deduction exceeds $3000, then, in the year of repayment, the taxpayer is allowed the deduction or takes a credit that is
generally equal to the amount of tax incurred due to the earlier inclusion, whichever is more beneficial. 12 1
The provision is generally viewed as an ameliorating exception
to strict annual tax accounting and the claim of right doctrine. 122 Suppose that a $10,000 item of income was included in 2018 when the

120. TCJA, supra note 52, § 11045; I.R.C. § 67(g).
121. I.R.C. § 1341(a).
122. United States v. Skelly Oil Co., 394 U.S. 678, 680-81 (1969)
("Section 1341 ... was enacted to alleviate some of the inequities" that followed from the claim of right doctrine and annual accounting); Rev. Rul.
2004-17, 2004-1 C.B. 516 ("Congress enacted § 1341 to ameliorate th[e]
inequity in cases" in which a taxpayer receives and includes income in one
year and repays and deducts the repayment in a later year).
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taxpayer was in a 25% marginal rate bracket and was repaid in 2019
when the taxpayer was in a 12% marginal bracket, and assume that
deductibility for the repayment is clear (and fully allowed) under @ 162.
Under a strict annual accounting system, the $1200 reduction in tax in
2019 associated with the deduction would not fully make up for the
$2500 in tax associated with the 2018 inclusion. But, of course, a credit
for the prior year's incremental tax, allowed under @ 1341(a)(5), perfectly offsets the prior year's tax.
Given the disallowance of MIDs under the TCJA, however,
@ 1341 potentially can do much more for individuals subject to clawback obligations than merely correcting for rate changes. Assuming
that it applies, @ 1341 can turn a disallowed deduction into an effective,
allowed deduction. Consider the example described in the Introduction. Executive receives a $1 million cash bonus in 2019 that is based
on the achievement of an earnings target, and Executive pays federal
income tax on $1 million. In 2020, the firm restates earnings for 2019,
and it is determined based on the restated earnings that Executive was
entitled to a bonus of $700,000. Executive repays the company
$300,000. Assuming that @ 1341 applies, Executive would be entitled to
a $300,000 non-miscellaneous itemized deduction in 2020 or a credit
for the 2019 tax on $300,000, whichever is more beneficial. Without
@ 1341, Executive would have a non-deductible $300,000 MID.
2. Section 1341 Requirements
Section 1341 does not apply to all repayments of previously taxed
income. This Subpart considers two important limitations on its availability: the existence of separate underlying basis for deduction and of
an apparent unrestricted right to the income in the year of receipt.
a. Underlying Deductibility
Section 1341 does not create a deduction or credit out of whole cloth.
For the provision to apply, there must be an underlying basis for a
deduction. 123 As discussed above, however, involuntary clawback payments generally are deductible under @@ 162/165, whether the payer is
an innocent bystander relative to an earnings restatement, a culpable

123. I.R.C. § 1341(a)(2) (requiring as a predicate that "a deduction
is allowable for the taxable year").
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participant in falsifying financials, or the violator of company policies
or the terms of an employment agreement. To be sure, a voluntary
repayment of compensation that would not be deductible under
@@ 162/165 would not support a deduction or credit under @ 1341.124 But
modern clawback regimes are almost always involuntary exactions
imposed through regulation or pre-existing corporate policy, so "voluntariness" should not be an impediment to the application of @ 1341.
The enactment of the TCJA, however, raises a new issue with
respect to the underlying deductibility predicate for the application of
@ 1341 to clawback payments. Specifically, the text of @ 1341 requires
that "a deduction is allowable for the taxable year" in which the clawback payment is made and that "the amount of such deduction exceeds
$3000."125 But what exactly does this mean? An executive who is
required to repay a $1 million bonus is allowed a $1 million deduction
under @@ 162/165, an amount that far exceeds $3000. But between 2018
and 2025, this MID is totally disallowed. Do we look to deductibility in
the first instance under @@ 162/165 or to ultimate deductibility, taking
into account limitations on the deductibility of MIDs? This question
could have arisen prior to the enactment of the TCJA, but I find no evidence that it has. This is not too surprising given the infrequency of
SEC application of the SOX clawback and the paucity of companyinitiated clawback actions under voluntarily adopted programs, 126 as
well as the fact that, before the TCJA, limitations on the deductibility
of MIDs would have resulted in ultimate non-deductibility in only a
subset of clawback cases. Today, the deductibility of all clawback payments turns on this question.
The Treasury has interpreted the statutory language quoted
above as providing for special tax treatment under @ 1341 "if, during the
taxable year, the taxpayer is entitled under other provisions of [the Code]
to a deduction of more than $3000 because of the restoration" of an item
of income included in a prior year under a claim of right. 1 27 This language seems most consistent with a restrictive, ultimate deductibility

124. See supra note 112 and accompanying text. For example, the
IRS would likely challenge the application of § 1341 to a clawback required
under a company policy adopted contemporaneously with the triggering
event, particularly if the taxpayer was in a position to influence adoption.
125. I.R.C. § 1341(a)(2)-(3).
126. See supra notes 17 and 32-34 and accompanying text.
127. Treas. Reg. § 1.1341-1(a)(1).
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reading of the statute. An ultimate deductibility reading is also suggested by a Treasury Regulation that explicitly provides that the $3000
capital loss limitation under I.R.C. @ 1211 shall not be taken into account
in determining whether deductions that are capital in nature satisfy the
requirement that the amount of the underlying deduction exceed
$3000.128 There would be no need for such a regulation if analysis ended
with deductibility in the first instance. Needless to say, there is no analogous regulation addressing limitations on MIDs.
On the other hand, @ 67(b)(9) provides that deductions taken
pursuant to @ 1341 are not MIDs. When @ 1341 applies, and when the
current year deduction provides greater tax relief than a prior year
credit, the deduction is not subject to @ 67 limitations on MIDs. To be
sure, the existence of @ 67(b)(9) does not resolve the matter. Section 67(b)(9) only comes into play if @ 1341 applies. But as Professor
Douglas Kahn has argued, @ 67(b)(9) clearly reflects a legislative view
that repayment of an amount previously held under claim of right was
not the "type of situation that warranted the limitations impose[d] on"
MIDs and that it is "not plausible" that Congress could have intended
that the suspension of MIDs effectively reversed this determination. 129
Kahn also argues that an ultimate deductibility reading of @ 1341 would
cause the TCJA's disallowance of MIDs to impliedly repeal @ 67(b)(9),
which would then have no application between 2018 and 2025, and he
notes the strong presumption against such implied repeal.130
I agree with Professor Kahn. The more sensible interpretation
of @ 1341 is that relief is available if the amount repaid exceeds $3000
and the repayment is deductible in the first instance under other provisions of the Code. 131 We must recognize the ambiguity, however, and the
lack of regulatory guidance or case law on the question. I will assume
for the remainder of my analysis that limitations on MIDs do not affect
the availability of @ 1341, but this must be considered an open question.

128. Treas. Reg. § 1.1341-1(c).
129. Kahn, supra note 6, at 1821.
130. Id. at 1821 n.9 (citing Posadas v. Nat'l City Bank, 296 U.S.
497, 503 (1936); Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254 (2003)).
131. See IRS Serv. Ctr. Advice Mem. 1998-026 (Aug. 31, 1998)
("Section 1341 provides that when a substantial amount (more than $3,000)
held under a claim of right is restored by the taxpayer, the taxpayer has two
alternative methods of calculating the tax liability for the year of repayment.").
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b. Apparent UnrestrictedRight
Section 1341 only applies to amounts included in income in a prior year
because of an apparent unrestricted right that later turns out to be
untrue.1 32 Embezzlers who are caught, are forced to repay stolen funds
in a later year, and find that a change in marginal rates between the
year of the theft and the repayment leaves them at a net tax disadvantage may not look to @ 1341 for relief because they did not have even an
apparent right to the embezzled funds in the first place.133 Unfortunately, beyond this, the IRS and courts have not settled on an interpretation of the language: "appeared that the taxpayer had an unrestricted
right," and the differences in interpretation create uncertainty with
respect to the application of @ 1341 to clawbacks, and, in particular, to
"bad boy" clawbacks.
In a series of Revenue Rulings promulgated in the 1950s and
1960s, the IRS interpreted the requirement that a taxpayer have an
apparent unrestricted right to an item in an earlier year to preclude the
application of @ 1341 to situations in which a taxpayer had an actual
unrestricted right to the item but was required to repay as a result of
subsequent events. 13 4 For example, Revenue Ruling 67-48 dealt with a
taxpayer who was contractually obligated to repay prior year compensation as a result of his breach of an employment contract.135 The ruling
held that the repayment was deductible under @ 165, but not under
@ 1341, because the taxpayer had an actual unrestricted right to the
compensation at the time of receipt and the repayment obligation "arose
as a result of subsequent events," i.e., the breach of his employment
contract. 136

132. I.R.C. § 1341(a)(1) ("an item was included in gross income for
a prior taxable year (or years) because it appeared that the taxpayer had an
unrestricted right to such item").
133. McKinney v. United States, 574 F.2d 1240, 1243 (5th Cir.1978);
Yerkie v. Comm'r, 67 T.C. 388, 392 (1976).
134. Rev. Rul. 69-115, 1969-1 C.B. 50; Rev. Rul. 68-153, 1968-1
C.B. 371; Rev. Rul. 67-437, 1967-2 C.B. 296; Rev. Rul. 67-48, 1967-1 C.B. 50.
135. Rev. Rul. 67-48, 1967-1 C.B. 50.
136. Id. The essence of the IRS's argument was that in a situation
such as this the taxpayer does not hold the funds under a claim of right and
does not include the item in income under a claim of right but simply as
income from whatever source derived.
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More recently, the IRS has softened its interpretation somewhat, arguing that the determination of whether the taxpayer appeared
to have an unrestricted right to the income must be based on facts in
existence at the time of receipt and not facts that arose subsequently.137
For example, in Dominion Resources v. United States, after 1986 tax
reform reduced corporate tax rates, a utility was required to refund $10
million that had been collected from customers to cover deferred tax
liabilities.138 The IRS argued that @ 1341 was inapplicable because,
based on the facts in existence in the year of receipt, the utility did not
appear to have an unrestricted right to the income; it had an actual
right to the income. 139
Some courts have embraced this approach.1 4 0 Other courts
have rejected the IRS's interpretation of "apparent unrestricted right"
and have adopted a more liberal reading, requiring only that "the requisite lack of an unrestricted right to an income item permitting deduction [in a subsequent year] must arise out of the circumstances, terms,
and conditions of the original payment of such item to the taxpayer." 14 1
In the Dominion Resources case discussed above, for example, the
Fourth Circuit panel concluded that the utility's repayment arose out of
the same circumstances as the original collection-the creation and
maintenance of a reserve for deferred income taxes-and thus satisfied
the "apparent unrestricted right" requirement for application of @ 1341.
How does this disagreement affect the availability of relief
under @ 1341 for individuals making clawback payments? The answer
depends on the circumstances.
Let us begin with the case of an executive who is required to
restore a bonus to her employer under a no-fault clawback arrangement that has been imposed through legislation or contract and who,
in fact, bore no responsibility for the events triggering the earnings

137. Barker & O'Brien, supra note 6, at 431-32 (discussing the
IRS's shift from a "subsequent events" test to a "facts in existence" test).
138. Dominion Res., Inc. v. United States, 219 F.3d 359 (4th Cir.
2000).
139. Id. at 364.
140. See, e.g., Cinergy Corp. v. United States, 55 Fed. Cl. 489
(2003) (holding that § 1341 was not available to a utility that had been required
to refund deferred taxes to its customers as a result of subsequent settlement
with its regulators).
141. Dominion Res., 219 F.3d at 367 (quoting Pahl v. Comm'r, 67
T.C. 286, 290 (1976) (quoting Blanton v. Comm'r, 46 T.C. 527, 530 (1966))).
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restatement, an innocent bystander, so to speak. Section 1341 relief
should not be barred by any of these interpretations of "apparent unrestricted right." Clearly, under the "same circumstances" test adopted
in Dominion Resources and other cases, clawbacks of previously
awarded excessive bonuses resulting from earnings restatements arise
out of the "circumstances, terms, and conditions" of the previous year
payment. The net effect of the clawback in these cases is essentially a
redetermination of the bonus due the executive for the prior year. As
such, these cases satisfy the "apparent unrestricted right" prong of
@ 1341 as this language has been interpreted by these courts.
The repayment, moreover, is only trivially connected with a
subsequent event and is dictated by facts in existence at the time of
receipt. The events that determined both the original payment and the
clawback, e.g., the achievement of certain earnings targets, occurred at
the same time; it was only the redetermination of the earnings result
that occurred in a later period. Thus, these cases should also satisfy the
IRS's more restrictive interpretations of "apparent unrestricted right."
Despite this, the government has argued that @ 1341 relief is
unavailable under just these sorts of facts. For example, the taxpayer in
Van Cleave v. United States was the majority shareholder of a closely
held corporation who repaid a portion of his compensation, pursuant to
a pre-existing bylaw and agreement, after the IRS determined that the
portion was excessive and not deductible by the corporation.1 4 2 The
government argued that @ 1341 did not apply because Van Cleave had
an actual unrestricted right to the compensation in the year of receipt
(as opposed to an apparent unrestricted right) and that the repayment
obligation flowed from a subsequent event, the determination that the
compensation was excessive. 143
The Sixth Circuit held for the taxpayer in Van Cleave, disagreeing with the government's contention that Van Cleave had an
actual unrestricted right to the compensation in the year of receipt.14 4 It
seems clear that the government overreached in Van Cleave. Although
the IRS determined in a subsequent year that Van Cleave's compensation was excessive in the year of payment, fundamentally the payment
was excessive in the year of payment irrespective of future events.
These facts are distinguishable from those in Rev. Rul. 67-48 where

142.
143.
144.

Van Cleave v. United States, 718 F.2d 193 (6th Cir. 1983).
Id. at 197.
Id.

570

FloridaTax Review

[Vol 24:2

the repayment obligation arose from a breach of an employment contract that occurred in a year subsequent to the receipt of the income.
Moreover, the facts of Van Cleave would clearly satisfy the IRS's
slightly more lenient "facts in existence" standard for the same reason.
The bottom line is that the "apparent unrestricted right" requirement
should not be an obstacle to the application of @ 1341 to "innocent"
executives making no-fault clawback payments.
Slightly less certain, but still reasonably certain under all tests,
is the application of @ 1341 to SOX mandated clawbacks from CEOs and
CFOs of bonuses, incentive-based, and equity-based pay received
within 12 months of the filing of a subsequently restated financial statement and profits on company stock sold within the same period.14 1 While
these clawbacks exceed those necessary to eliminate the benefit from
the misstated financials, they arise out of the "circumstances, terms, and
conditions" of the previous year payments, in the sense that the misstated financials would have had a bearing on bonuses and incentive/
equity pay and on the price at which shares were sold, and given SOX,
the terms and conditions under which CEOs and CFOs keep their compensation now include the absence of financial restatements. Certainly
it cannot be said that these perhaps over-broad SOX clawbacks "bear[]
no relationship" to the original compensation. 14 6
Moreover, these SOX-mandated clawbacks are predicated on
facts in existence in the year of receipt and do not arise from subsequent events, or certainly not in the way that a breach of contract in
year two is a subsequent event relative to receipt of compensation in
year one. Once again, while the restatement occurs in a later period,
the critical underlying event-the misstated financial report-occurs
before the compensation is received, and, again, the assumption is that
the misstated financials affected the amount of compensation.
In the discussion thus far, I have assumed that an executive
facing a clawback obligation was not personally involved in fraudulent
activity that prompted an earnings restatement. But what if she was?
Recall that employer-initiated clawbacks are often limited to executives directly responsible for a triggering event. That triggering event

145. SOX, supra note 1, § 304(a).
146. Cf Bailey v. Comm'r, 756 F.2d 44, 47 (6th Cir. 1985) (rejecting the application of § 1341 to a fine, later converted into restitution, paid for
violation of a consent decree as the violation did not arise out of the same
circumstances as the taxpayer's original receipt of salary and dividends).
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might be a restatement flowing from a good faith error, or it could
result from fraud.
Although there are no cases or Revenue Rulings directly on
point, presumably an executive established to have fraudulently stated
earnings would not be entitled to rely on @ 1341 to recover taxes on
clawed back compensation based upon the fraudulent earnings. The bar
to the application of @ 1341 would be the lack of an apparent unrestricted
right to the compensation in the year of payment, under any interpretation of "apparent unrestricted right." 1 4 For the purposes of @ 1341, the
receipt of a bonus based on knowingly inflated earnings is akin to
embezzlement. The Fifth Circuit has held that it is the appearance to the
taxpayer that controls, 148 and, as the Federal Circuit has stated "[w]hen a
taxpayer knowingly obtains funds as the result of fraudulent action, it
simply cannot appear from the facts known to him at the time that he
has a legitimate, unrestricted claim to the money."14 9
Finally, what about the application of @ 1341 to "bad boy"
clawbacks? Consider a company policy requiring executives to repay
or return all bonuses, equity awards, shares derived from equity
awards, and profits from share sales within the last five years if the
officer breaches any non-competition, non-solicitation, or confidentiality agreement. Suppose an executive breaches one of these agreements
and makes the requisite payments and transfers. Recall that while the
SOX, TARP, and Dodd-Frank clawback provisions are focused on
financial accounting restatements, employer-initiated clawbacks often
are predicated upon this sort of misconduct. Presumably, @ 1341 would
not apply to such clawbacks under the IRS's subsequent events test
since these clawbacks are indeed triggered by events (competition,
solicitation, breach of confidentiality) that occurred after the year in
which the clawed back compensation was paid. These cases seem to fit
squarely within the confines of Revenue Ruling 67-48."' Further,
these clawbacks do not arise wholly from facts in existence at the time
of receipt. The risk of clawback was known, but the behavior that triggered the clawback occurred later. As such, these clawbacks also fail
the facts in existence standard for determining an apparent unrestricted
right.

147.
148.
149.
150.

See Melone, supra note 6, at 93 (reaching the same conclusion).
McKinney v. United States, 574 F.2d 1240, 1243 (5th Cir.1978).
Culley v. United States, 222 F.3d 1331, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
Supra notes 134-136 and accompanying text.
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But do these "bad boy" clawbacks satisfy the same circumstances test adopted by several circuit courts of appeal? I think that
they do. An executive receives her compensation subject to the clawback policy. Her right to retain the compensation is contingent on compliance with its terms. The repayment does not arise "from a different
commercial relationship or legal obligation."" The repayment is "a
counterpart or complement of the item of income originally received.""
In sum, it appears that a taxpayer has an apparent unrestricted
right to compensation, under any interpretation, and may invoke @ 1341
(assuming other tests are met) in innocent restatement cases, but may
not invoke @ 1341 if culpable for fraudulent earnings that trigger
restatements, again under any theory. By contrast, @ 1341 appears to
reach "bad boy" clawbacks under the "same circumstances" test but
not under the IRS's more restrictive tests.
3. Further§ 1341 Asymmetries
While @ 1341 should provide a deduction or credit for an executive faced
with a clawback obligation under many circumstances, the provision
was not designed to perfectly offset the earlier tax payment, and it does
not always do so. This Subpart briefly describes some asymmetries.
When it applies to clawed back cash compensation, @ 1341 provides the taxpayer with the better of a current year deduction or what is
effectively a credit for the prior year payment, and it can result in windfalls for executives. Suppose an executive receives a $1 million bonus
in 2019 that she is required to repay in 2020 as a result of an earnings
restatement. Suppose her marginal federal income tax rate was 40% in
2019 and 35% in 2020. She would have paid $400,000 in federal tax on
the bonus in 2019 and would effectively receive a credit for that amount
in 2020, as the tax reduction associated with a 2020 deduction would
be less ($350,000).153 In this case, we get a perfect offset of the previous
year's tax burden. Suppose, however, that the marginal rates were
flipped: 35% in 2019 and 40% in 2020. In this case, the executive would
make a $50,000 tax profit on the 2019 inclusion ($350,000 tax cost)

151. Pennzoil-Quaker St. Co. v. United States, 511 F.3d 1365, 1370
(Fed. Cir. 2008).
152. Id.
153. I.R.C. § 1341(a)(5).
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coupled with a 2020 deduction ($400,000 tax benefit), since the 2020
deduction benefit exceeds the credit for 2019 tax paid.1 4
The SEC's proposed clawback rule implementing Dodd-Frank
would require the forfeiture of shares issued as incentive compensation, if still held as shares, or the sale proceeds, if the shares have been
sold.1" Forfeiture of stock-based compensation could result in a disadvantageous tax asymmetry for executives subject to clawbacks.
Suppose in 2019 an executive receives vested stock worth
$100,000 as the payout from a performance share plan. The fair value
will be taxed at that time. Now suppose that the shares are clawed back
in 2020 following an earnings restatement. Suppose that the executive
retains and forfeits the shares. First, suppose that the shares are worth
$120,000 at forfeiture. The current year deduction under @ 1341(a)(4)
would be $100,000, the basis of the stock.156 The 2019 adjustment under
@ 1341(a)(5) would be exclusion of $100,000. Although the stock forfeited is worth $120,000, per Treasury Regulations the amount excluded
under @ 1341(a)(5) is the lesser of the amount restored and the amount
included in the prior year.157 In this scenario, we have a perfect offset of
earlier included income under either @ 1341(a)(4) or @ 1341(a)(5).158
Now suppose that in 2020 the fair value of the forfeited stock is
$80,000. The executive would still be entitled to a current year deduction of her basis in the stock of $100,000 under @ 1341(a)(4). 159 But
under @ 1341(a)(5), she would be permitted to exclude only $80,000 in
recalculating her 2019 tax liability, not $100,000.160
If it turns out that marginal tax rates are the same or higher in
2020, such that @ 1341(a)(4) controls, the executive enjoys a full tax
offset for earlier paid tax. But if marginal rates are lower in 2020, such
that @ 1341(a)(5) controls, the cases are not symmetrical. An executive
would enjoy a full offset of previously paid tax in the increasing stock
price scenario but something less than a full offset in the declining
share price scenario.

154. I.R.C. § 1341(a)(4).
155. See SEC Release, supra note 3, at 46.
156. Treas. Reg. § 1.83-1(e).
157. Treas. Reg. § 1.1341-1(d)(2)(i).
158. This is a sensible result because the executive has not paid
tax on the $20,000 unrealized gain.
159. Treas. Reg. § 1.83-1(e).
160. Treas. Reg. § 1.1341-1(d)(2)(i).
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To be sure, this disadvantageous result could be avoided if an
executive can sell the shares and forfeit the cash. 161 In the declining
share price example, an executive who sold $100,000 basis shares for
$80,000 and forfeited $80,000 cash would still be permitted to exclude
$80,000, the amount forfeited, but she would also have the tax benefit
of a $20,000 capital loss. Generally, executives can sell vested shares,
in which case the differential treatment of share and cash forfeiture
would largely be a trap for the unwary.
Also, to be sure, any asymmetries in the application of @ 1341
to clawed back compensation arising from marginal tax rate changes
are likely to be a second order concern. While achieving fairness for
taxpayers otherwise disadvantaged by rate changes occurring between
receipt and repayment of amounts held under claim of right was the
rationale for the enactment of @ 1341, assuming it applies in the clawback context, the overwhelming value of @ 1341 lies in the avoidance of
the prior limitations on and current bar to the deductibility of MIDs
under I.R.C. @ 67.

V.

HOw WELL DOES ACTUAL CLAWBACK TAX TREATMENT

ACHIEVE OPTIMAL TAX TREATMENT?

This Part compares the current tax treatment of clawed back funds
with the various objectives discussed in Part III. I conclude that while
one could argue that the most probable tax treatment under @ 1341 is
roughly consistent with unjust enrichment and deterrence goals, a tax
regime providing for full offset of tax previously paid on returned compensation in all cases would be superior.
A. Unjust Enrichment
Under an unjust enrichment-focused approach, executives facing clawback obligations would forfeit unearned compensation and would face
no net tax burden as a result of the returned pay. To be sure, taxes aside,
not all clawbacks work this way. The SOX clawback goes beyond remedying unjust enrichment by requiring recoupment of all incentive pay
within a window, not just excess pay, whereas the Dodd-Frank

161. To repeat, the Dodd-Frank clawback provision envisions forfeiture of cash proceeds received on disposition of equity compensation subject to clawbacks.
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clawback design-requiring forfeiture of excess pay associated with
the misstated financials-does appear to focus on eliminating unjust
enrichment. Employer-adopted clawbacks reflect both approaches.162
To the extent that @ 1341 provides a full offset for clawed back
compensation, it is consistent with an unjust enrichment-focused
approach. Recall that, as interpreted by the courts in cases like Van
Cleave and Dominion Resources, @ 1341 would apply to "bad boy"
clawbacks and to restatement-driven clawbacks, except for cases in which
executives are culpable in financial misstatement. In cases in which executives are culpable, @ 1341 would not apply, and under current law
these executives would receive no deduction or credit for tax paid on
the compensation that was later returned, creating a tax penalty, not
just a corrective for unjust enrichment. Moreover, the IRS is likely to
be less generous than the courts in its application of @ 1341, refusing,
for example, to apply it to "bad boy" clawbacks that fail its "apparent
unrestricted right" test. This too would be excessive under an unjust
enrichment approach. As noted above, even when @ 1341 applies, it
does not always result in a perfect tax offset, but those differences seem
secondary (from an unjust enrichment-remedying perspective) to its
failure to provide any offset in certain situations.
To be sure, the argument that clawback rules should prevent
unjust enrichment but do no more is most compelling in the case of nofault, restatement-driven clawbacks. So, to that extent, one could argue
that the fit between @ 1341 treatment and the unjust enrichment ideal is
not far off the mark.
B. DeterringFinancialMisreporting
By allowing for full tax offsets with respect to restatement-triggered
clawbacks, except for cases in which executives are culpable in financial misstatement, @ 1341 appears to be reasonably consistent with an
objective of deterring financial misreporting. Although the loss of a
deduction for falsifiers goes beyond unjust enrichment, at first blush, at
least, this loss raises few concerns with over-deterring accounting
fraud. The loss of the deduction creates a penalty for misreporting
when detected, and the optimal amount of accounting fraud is zero.
But all is not quite so simple. An executive faced with a clawback obligation in the wake of a restatement might be a wholly

162.

See supra Part II.
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innocent bystander, having nothing to do with the misstatements whatsoever, an obviously culpable fraudster, or something in between, perhaps an executive responsible for financial reporting who has no
knowledge of the underlying misstatements. Or perhaps her knowledge
is unclear. Or perhaps the legitimacy of the original financials was
debatable. In which of these cases would we say that the executive did
not have an apparent unrestricted right to the income and would not be
entitled to tax offsets under @ 1341? At the very least, reliance on @ 1341
for tax offsets for restatement-triggered clawbacks introduces potential
litigation into the determination of an executive's culpability. At most,
the lack of tax offsets for culpable (whatever that means) financial misreporting could result in overly conservative reporting practices, as
discussed in the next Subpart.
C. MitigatingExcess Risk-Taking Incentives
Although we desire zero accounting fraud, not all aggressive financial
reporting positions are fraudulent, and shareholders may benefit from
reasonable, aggressive reporting. The unavailability of @ 1341 for culpable mis-reporters could inhibit that healthy activity.
Some clawback provisions target substantive risk taking with
triggers ranging from misconduct to violation of fiduciary duty to detrimental activity to explicit excessive risk taking.163 These triggers are
analogous to the "bad boy" clawback triggers previously discussedviolation of non-competition, non-solicitation, or non-disclosure agreements. Under some readings of @ 1341, the provision would allow for
tax offsets for clawbacks triggered by such activity. The IRS's more
restrictive reading might not. Meanwhile, it is difficult to design an
optimal deterrence scheme for "excessive" risk taking. All we know is
that this is an activity that can be over-deterred. To the extent that firms
optimally, or at least thoughtfully, design forfeiture for excessive risktaking provisions, they are more likely to do so on a pre-tax than posttax basis, particularly given variation in executive tax positions, as
discussed below. Thus, a scheme that fails to fully offset taxes on
clawed back compensation poses a real risk of over-deterrence. 61 4

163. BBBCS, supra note 4, at 45 (misconduct and negligence of
fiduciary duty (520%); detrimental activity (11%); excessive risk taking (1%)).
164. This is not to suggest that deterrence of fraudsters is an unimportant goal. Tax rules, however, would seem to be a relatively ineffective and

20211

Executive Pay Clawbacks and Their Taxation

577

D. Fairness
As discussed above, 165 the fairest scheme for taxing clawbacks-the
approach that is most consistent executive to executive and least likely
to punish innocents-would provide full offsets for taxes on clawed
back compensation. Given the fact that some executives may meet
clawback obligations out of pre-tax funds (untaxed equity or deferred
compensation) while others have access only to after-tax funds, anything less than full offset can result in unintentional inconsistency.
Moreover, except in a system in which culpability is incontrovertible,
tying offsets to culpability, as @ 1341 does, will inevitably result in
some mistaken deduction disallowances, and/or the need for litigation.
E. Dynamic Responses
How we tax clawbacks matters. If full tax offsets are not allowed, companies will be less likely to adopt clawback provisions voluntarily, will
tend to adopt weaker clawback provisions, and will tend to enforce
clawback provisions less strictly. Section 1341 approaches full offset,
but the gaps, or perhaps more importantly, the risk of gaps in its coverage is likely to influence firms in the directions I've just outlined.
But what about mandatory clawbacks? Surely firms can't avoid
these, and so a scheme that provides less than full offset of taxes paid on
clawed back funds shouldn't have negative behavioral consequences,
right? Wrong. First, to the extent that companies have discretion in
enforcement, they will use that discretion to a greater degree if tax offsets
might not be available. Second, if tax offsets are incomplete or uncertain,
companies might expend greater effort or cost in designing compensation
to minimize the risk that their executives will face clawbacks. 166 Third,
executives facing the possibility of asymmetric tax treatment may make
greater use of deferred compensation, which might be good or bad, but is

inefficient tool. There are other means of deterring accounting fraud, including SEC sanctions, reputational harm, potential loss of employment, etc.
There is no reason to rely on the tax code to deter fraudsters, and given the
risk of mistake, accounting fraud is better not enforced through the tax rules
applicable to clawbacks.
165. See supra Part IIIC.
166. This incentive exists even with full tax offsets, but the incentive is greater if full offsets are not assured.
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certainly distorting. Fourth, executives are likely to demand and receive
additional compensation to make up for the tax risk associated with
potential clawbacks or to demand gross-ups (explicit or implicit) for any
tax losses actually incurred. All of which is suboptimal.

VI.

OTHER RESPONSES TO LIMITED DEDUCTIBILITY OF

CLAWBACK PAYMENTS

This Part considers two other potential dynamic responses to limited
deductibility of clawback payments under current tax rules that merit
somewhat fuller exploration. First, some companies and executives
may opt for a "self-help" solution to limited clawback payment deductibility electing to defer receipt of and tax on some incentive pay. This
approach will "work" for tax purposes, but care must be taken to avoid
incurring a @ 409A penalty tax on clawed back deferred compensation.
Second, some companies might attempt to avoid deduction limitations
by reducing compensation of executives subject to clawback obligations in subsequent years instead of requiring these executives to actually repay compensation. In my view, this approach is unlikely to
"work" for tax purposes.
A. Clawbacks of Deferred Compensation andIR.C.

§ 409A

Firms and executives can avoid the problem of inadequate tax offsets
for clawback payments by ensuring that any clawed back compensation
has not been subjected to tax in the first place. This could be done by
extending the vesting periods for incentive compensation beyond likely
clawback windows. It could also be accomplished by deferring sufficient compensation, pursuant to employer-operated nonqualified deferred
compensation (NQDC) programs, to cover any conceivable clawback
obligation.167 However, while these strategies avoid the possibility of
executives paying unrecoverable tax on ultimately clawed back compensation, they also raise potential headaches under I.R.C. @ 409A.
Enacted in the wake of the Enron debacle and other corporate
scandals, @ 409A tightens the rules on NQDC and imposes significant
penalties on NQDC that fails to comply with those rules. 168 NQDC is

167. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
168. The primary requirements under § 409A have to do with the
timing of elections to defer compensation (§ 409A(a)(4)) and the timing of
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defined very broadly under @ 409A to include equity compensation, if
not exempted, as well as traditional NQDC plans, such as elective nonqualified defined contribution plans and nonqualified defined benefit
pension plans. 169 Although nonqualified stock options and restricted
stock also provide for deferral, the regulations under @ 409A specifically
exempt these equity compensation instruments from the rules,' but
these equity instruments are in decline at public companies. 171 The
newly ascendant equity instruments-restricted stock units and performance shares-may be subject to @ 409A, depending on their design.
Let's focus on elective NQDC, which is clearly subject to
@ 409A. Suppose an executive makes an election to defer her 2018
annual bonus under her firm's elective NQDC plan. If a number of
well-defined rules are followed, the executive will not be taxed on that
bonus in 2018 but will be taxed on the bonus and any investment earnings on that bonus at payout. 17 2 In order to satisfy @ 409A, in particular,
the payout must be made on a predetermined date or dates or upon the
occurrence of another @ 409A-sanctioned event, such as death, disabil17 4
ity, or severance.17' Payout may not be accelerated.
Suppose the 2018 bonus is clawed back in 2020. The good
news, tax-wise, is that because the deferred bonus was not taxable (to
the executive or the firm) in 2018, no offsets are required in 2020. The
concern is whether the transfer out of the executive's NQDC account

payouts (§ 409A(a)(2)). NQDC that does not comply with the § 409A rules is
subject to taxation at vesting and to an additional 20% penalty tax. I.R.C.
§ 409A(a)(1).
169. These plans are analogues of more familiar tax-preferred
qualified defined contribution plans, such as 401(k) plans, and qualified
defined benefit pension plans.
170. Treas. Reg. § 1.409A-1(b)(5)(i)(A) (nonqualified stock options);
Treas. Reg. § 1.409A-1(b)(6) (restricted stock).
171. See Walker, supra note 98, at 405-08.
172. See Miller, supra note 61, at 255-69. In order to achieve tax
deferral, a nonqualified deferred compensation obligation must represent only
an "unfunded and unsecured promise to pay money or property in the future"
(Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(e)), participants must be "general unsecured creditors"
of the employer (Rev. Proc. 92-65, 1992-2 C.B. 428), and the arrangement
must satisfy the requirements of I.R.C. § 409A.
173. I.R.C. § 409A(a)(2).
174. I.R.C. § 409A(a)(3).
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back to the company represents an impermissible payout, acceleration,
or substitution under @ 409A.
I am not aware of any authority on this question. Some practitioners have recommended drafting clawback policies to pull funds
from sources other than NQDC in order to avoid potential problems
under @ 409A. 175 Other practitioners, however, recommend drafting
clawback provisions to provide for the "forfeiture" of NQDC that is
clawed back, rather than the "repayment" of such compensation. 176
Under the Treasury Regulations, a forfeiture of NQDC is not treated as
a payment and should not trigger the negative repercussions associated
with non-complying payments under @ 409A. 177
The bottom line here is that while NQDC looks like the solution to the potential pitfalls associated with relying on @ 1341 to recover
taxes previously paid on clawed back compensation, there are also
potential pitfalls to using this approach that are created by @ 409A. Ideally, the Treasury would amend the regulations to include clawback
payments in its list of permissible distribution events, or the Treasury
or IRS would at least provide guidance confirming that a clawback forfeiture of NQDC does not trigger adverse consequences under @ 409A.

175. Jeff Haughey & Alan Kandel, SEC Clawback Rules Have
Executive Tax Consequences, SEC. L. INSIDER (Oct. 5, 2015), https://web
.archive.org/web/20160410230554/http://www.securitieslawinsider.com/2015
/10/sec-clawback-rules-have-executive-tax-consequences/
[https://perma.cc
/W9MY-N9WF]; Katherine Blostein, Clawbacks: Trends and Developments
in Executive Compensation, ABA 7 (Mar. 25, 2010), https://www.americanbar
.org/digital-asset-abstract.html/content/dam/aba/administrative/labor_law
/meetings/2010/2010_err_014.pdf [https://perma.cc/L3WF-AD3Q].
176. Joshua A Agen & Leigh C. Riley, Compensation Clawbacks
and Code Section 409A Acceleration, FOLEY (Jan. 8, 2014), https://www.foley
.com/en/insights/publications/2014/01/compensation-clawbacks-and-code
-section-409a-accel [https://perma.cc/YBB9-CHZL]; Rosina B. Barker, Compensation Clawbacks: Tax Consequences for Issuers and Executives, IVINS
PHILLIPS BARKER 15 (Oct. 7, 2015), https://www.ipbtax.com/media/news/333
_Barker%20Clawbacks%o20_2_.pdf [https://perma.cc/24GF-XPSH].
177. Treas. Reg. § 1.409A-3(f) (providing that a forfeiture of an
amount of deferred compensation will not be treated as a payment as long as
the participant does not receive an offsetting payment).
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B. Clawback Holdbacks
In implementing the Dodd-Frank clawback or their own voluntarily
adopted clawback schemes, companies might arrange to reduce the pay
of executives subject to clawback obligations in a future year by the
amount of the obligation in lieu of requiring these executives to actually repay the clawback amount. 178 Implementing clawbacks through
this "holdback" technique might be administratively convenient for
companies and less onerous for their executives. Moreover, one might
think that since the executives would actually repay no compensation,
the tax issues discussed above might disappear. The tax treatment of
holdbacks is uncertain, however, and in my view, unlikely to be advantageous vis-i-vis the "traditional" clawback approach.
Consider the example from the Introduction. Executive
receives a $1 million bonus in 2019 and pays tax on that amount. Following a 2020 earnings restatement, it is determined that the bonus
should have been $700,000. Under the traditional clawback approach,
Executive would be required to return $300,000 to the company and
her 2020 compensation would be unaffected. Under the holdback
approach, Executive would make no transfer to the company, but her
2020 compensation would be reduced by $300,000. Suppose she would
otherwise have been entitled to an $800,000 bonus in 2020. Her actual
2020 bonus would be $500,000.
If the reason for the 2020 pay reduction is ignored and taxes
are simply applied to the amounts paid in the various years, this holdback approach would eliminate any significant tax concerns. Executive
would pay tax on the $1 million bonus in 2019 and on a $500,000 bonus
in 2020. If her marginal tax rate is the same in the two years, this is
essentially equivalent to paying tax on $700,000 in 2019 and $800,000
in 2020.179
But would the IRS tax the cash flows like this or would it disaggregate the transactions and tax them consistently with the traditional
clawback approach? That is, require Executive to include $1 million and

178. Obviously, this technique would be feasible only with respect to
executives who remain employed by the company. Recall that the Dodd-Frank
clawback applies to "current and former" executives who received incentive
pay within the requisite window. See supratext accompanying note 20.
179. I am ignoring the modest time value of money difference
between taxes owed for 2019 and 2020.
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$800,000 in compensation in 2019 and 2020 respectively and allow
Executive a $300,000 deduction in 2020 subject to the limitations on
MIDs and the potential application of @ 1341? I am not aware of any
persuasive authority on this exact question, but there are doctrinal and
policy reasons to doubt that this holdback approach would improve the
overall tax picture for executives and their companies.
First, assuming that deduction of actual clawback payments
does not fully offset the tax incurred on the original receipt, ignoring
the underlying reality behind the holdback approach would result in
inconsistent treatment of companies or executives employing the two
techniques. For example, former executives subject to the Dodd-Frank
clawback would not be able to avail themselves of the holdback option
and might be penalized, effectively, vis-i-vis executives who remain
employed. Of course, if deduction of clawback payments does result in
a full offset of previously incurred tax, taxing holdbacks according to
the cash flows would not result in an inequity.
Second, the IRS could justify a decision to disaggregate the
reduced $500,000 net compensation in 2020 in my example into
$800,000 of income to Executive combined with a $300,000 payment
to the company by analogy to I.R.C. @ 7872's treatment of no/low
interest loans to employees or to cases such as Collins v. Commissioner.180 When @ 7872 applies to no or low interest loans from an employer
to an employee, the employee is taxed as if the employee paid a market
rate of interest to the employer and the employer simultaneously paid
the employee the same incremental amount in additional compensation. This disaggregation is analogous to deeming $300,000 as additional compensation in 2020, offset in my example by a deemed
$300,000 clawback payment. In Collins, the taxpayer, an employee at
an off-track betting parlor, entered bets totaling $80,000 on his own
behalf, without paying for them. After incurring net losses of $38,000,
he turned himself in to his boss, turned over his $42,000 of winning
tickets, and was fired. Collins argued that he suffered an overall tax
loss, but the IRS argued and the court held that the transactions should
be disaggregated into two transactions: (1) embezzlement of $80,000
and repayment of $42,000, and (2) a non-deductible gambling loss of
$38,000. Again, this disaggregation process seems analogous to the
likely treatment of compensation held back to cover an obligation to
repay compensation.

180.

Collins v. Comm'r, 3 F.3d 625 (2d Cir. 1993).
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Third, there is at least one (admittedly non-precedential) private letter ruling in which the IRS disaggregates a compensation holdback in just such a scenario. In PLR 9103031, one group of employees
was determined to have received excessive bonuses, and the company
was required to reduce their subsequent wages by the excess amount in
order to create a pool of funds to distribute to another group of employees who had received inadequate bonuses. The IRS held that the
amounts subtracted from the wages of the over-compensated employees would be included in the income of these employees and that these
"employees may take account of repayment of wages received in a
prior year for federal income tax purposes only by taking the repayment as an itemized deduction .. "181
In sum, while it is possible that a clawback holdback approach
might avoid adverse tax consequences associated with actual repayments in situations in which executives facing obligations remain
employed by the company, it would be unwise to rely on this technique
and favorable tax treatment as a global solution to the issue.

VII.

CONCLUSION AND THE ROAD AHEAD

From a corporate governance perspective, I prefer strict, comprehensive,
no-fault clawbacks of excess pay associated with earnings restatements. I have never understood why it isn't obvious that unearned
compensation should be returned to shareholders. Of course, shareholders will pay for this in the sense that executives will demand
greater compensation to offset the clawback risk. This is fair enough.
Another way to look at the current situation is that, absent clawbacks,
an element of executive pay is the opportunity to retain unearned
compensation. It is fairer and more efficient to tie incentive pay to
actual results and compensate executives ex ante for eliminating these
windfalls.8 2
This perspective is consistent with an unjust enrichment
approach to clawbacks and clawback taxation and to a tax scheme that
provides for full offset of any tax previously paid by executives on

181. P.L.R. 91-03-031 (Jan. 18, 1991) (citing Rev. Rul. 79-311,
1979-2 C.B. 25).
182. See Fried & Shilon, supra note 6, at 728 (arguing that allowing executives to profit from misstated financials-whether random or
purposeful-is an inefficient form of compensation).
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compensation that is subsequently returned. Deterrence rationales for
clawbacks are also plausible, and these rationales might justify a more
punitive tax scheme, i.e., something less than full offset, but other
considerations-fairness, consistency, minimizing distortions and
litigation-weigh against an asymmetric tax regime.
So, what is to be done? Ideally, Congress would adopt legislation that would provide individuals with a credit for tax paid on compensation that is subsequently returned to their companies as a result of
a clawback. Ideally, this tax treatment would apply to all clawbacks
irrespective of culpability and the basis for the clawback (restatement,
breach of contract, etc.).
Under current tax rules, the recovery of taxes paid by executives on clawed back compensation is basically an all or nothing proposition-if @ 1341 applies, the executive will be made whole; if @ 1341
does not apply, the deduction will be completely disallowed as a miscellaneous itemized deduction. In the case of restatement-based clawbacks, the difference between full offset and no offset turns on
culpability. The dollars at stake will be large, and one can expect extensive litigation over culpability under such a regime. Thus, while limited
or even no recovery of tax by fraudsters might be reconciled with a
deterrence rationale for clawbacks, distinguishing between culpable
and non-culpable executives would lead to costly and unnecessary litigation over culpability. There are better ways to deter fraud.
I am relatively unconcerned about clawbacks for "bad boy"
behavior, which are essentially liquidated damages provisions. Presumably, if firms and executives face asymmetric tax treatment with
respect to clawbacks, they can find other, more tax efficient ways, of
deterring these behaviors. Nonetheless, my inclination would be to provide for full tax offsets for these clawbacks as well because this seems
to best facilitate private ordering and because I cannot see why the
government should take a cut out of such arrangements through asymmetric tax treatment.
Of course, we are unlikely to see a legislative response along
these lines. Even if one could overcome the usual congressional dysfunction, the legislation I am suggesting has particularly poor optics. I
am suggesting that executives receive a tax deduction for amounts
repaid to their employers (or a credit for taxes previously paid) even in
cases in which someone has cooked the books. This seems unlikely.
Indeed, the more likely legislative response would be a move to deny
deductibility when and if permitted under @ 1341. It will be claimed,
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inaccurately, but predictably, that such deductions represent a taxpayer
subsidy for crooked executives.
As I have argued elsewhere, the disallowance of a businessrelated tax deduction tends to be conceptualized as the elimination of a
taxpayer subsidy.183 Despite the fact that the U.S. income tax system is
based on net, not gross, income, in thinking about any particular
deduction, observers tend to adopt a pre-deduction, gross income baseline, according to which deduction equals subsidy.184 This tendency, I
argue, is compounded by the inherent ambiguity of deductions in a net
income tax system. 185 Some deductions are subsidies. These deductions extend beyond those needed to compute net income under any
reasonable definition of the term. And this inherent ambiguity facilitates effective rhetoric that labels certain deductions that are needed to
reach net income as taxpayer subsidies.186
As an example of these pathologies, I offered the I.R.C. @ 162(m)
limitation on the deductibility of certain compensation paid to senior
executives of public companies. 187 An employer must be allowed a
deduction for employee compensation to reach net business income
under any conception of the term, and thus deductions for compensation
clearly are not subsidies. 188 Compensation may be excessive and ripe for
regulation, but if actually paid, a deduction for compensation is appropriate in determining net income. Nonetheless, policy makers were able
to exploit the tendency to frame deductions as subsidies and the ambiguity of deductions in justifying the 1993 enactment of @ 162(m), with
President Clinton arguing that "the Tax Code should no longer

183. David I. Walker, Suitable for Framing: Business Deductions
in a Net Income Tax System, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1247 (2011).
184. Id. at 1262. There are several reasons that this is the natural
baseline. For one, outside of the tax context, to "deduct" generally does mean
to subtract from some baseline.
185. Id. at 1263.
186. Id. at 1269.
187. Id. at 1268. Enacted in 1993, I.R.C. § 162(m) limited deductions by public companies for senior executive ("top five") pay to $1 million
per executive per year with a generous exception for performance-based pay.
That exception was eliminated by the TCJA. See supra note 55.
188. Id. at 1266.
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subsidize excessive pay of chief executives and other high executives." 189
Of course, the fact that corporate executives were and are an unpopular
bunch also didn't hurt efforts to curtail these deductions.
In the case of clawback payments, a deduction for amounts
repaid or a credit for taxes previously imposed on the returned compensation simply restores the status quo ante. One would think that careful
consideration of the matter would reveal that tax deductions or credits in
this situation are not taxpayer subsidies for this very reason. But I am
not sanguine. Tax credits sound like and generally are subsidies. Think
of the Earned Income Tax Credit,1 90 the Child Tax Credit, 191 or various
educational credits.1 92 These credits are all fairly characterized as subsidies delivered through the tax code. A credit for the taxes paid on
returned compensation would be an exception. And even a deduction
for the repaid compensation can be convincingly framed as a subsidy,
just as the tax deduction for executive pay was framed as a subsidy.
Even if I am wrong about the likelihood of a legislative push to
explicitly deny deductions or credits with respect to clawed back compensation, I think it extremely unlikely that Congress would enact legislation to explicitly grant such deductions or credits. In my view, the
best we can realistically hope for, legislatively, is stalemate. And absent
a legislative response, I would encourage the courts and the IRS to
interpret @ 1341 liberally to apply to all clawback payments except for
cases in which executives are clearly culpable for misstated financialsfor fraud, in other words. One cannot square the application of @ 1341
to fraud, and one should not try, but in all other cases the courts and
IRS should attempt to achieve the full tax offset ideal.

189. Id. at 1268 (quoting William J. Clinton, Remarks to Business
Leaders (Feb. 11, 1993), reprintedin 1 PUBLIC PAPERS OF PRESIDENT WILLIAM J.
CLINTON 85, 89 (1993)).
190. I.R.C. § 32.
191. I.R.C. § 24.
192. I.R.C. § 25A (allowing the American Opportunity Tax Credit
and Lifetime Learning Credit).

